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ABSTRACT: The non-literal elements of a computer program, such
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represent a substantial portion of the development costs of a
program, but they are quite inexpensive to copy. Courts are
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currently unable to agree on the extent to which copyright law
offers protection to the non-literal elements of computer programs,
leaving the industry uncertain and hesitant to develop new user
interfaces. This article develops a principled approach for
determining the proper scope of copyright protection for the non-
literal elements of computer programs.
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In today's society, computers have become a part of the every-
day lives of a large portion of the population, many members of
which have no formal training in computer science.1 The market
for computer programs is so pervasive that unauthorized copying
alone costs the software industry nearly $2 billion a year in lost
revenue.2 A number of mass-marketed programs, such as Lotus 1-
2-3 and Wordperfect, have become so well known that there is
even a market for "clones," programs that perform the same tasks
as these well-known programs in a similar manner, but at a lower
cost.3 Because the market for "user friendly" programs is so well-
developed, it is somewhat surprising that the scope of copyright
protection for such programs is unsettled.
A specific instance concerns protection for "non-literal" ele-
ments of programs. Courts have been unable to agree on the extent
to which a program's copyright protects the non-literal elements of
that program. Non-literal program elements are those which are
not manifested in the literal lines of the "code" of a computer pro-
gram. The non-literal elements of a program include its structure,
sequence, and organization; its screen displays; and its "look and
1. See Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Appli-
cation Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1052 (1989) (computers have entered
lives of many with no training in computer science).
2. Garfinkel, Programs to the People, TECHNOLOGY REV., Feb./Mar., 1991, at
53.
3. In Digital Communications Assoc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., the court
dealt with a "clone" designed to perform the same function as the plaintiff's pro-
gram "Crosstalk," which enabled computers to communicate with each other. 659
F. Supp. 449, 452-53 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
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feel."" These non-literal elements are perceived by the user when
the program runs; they cannot be perceived by merely reading the
"text" of the program code. The user interface of a computer pro-
gram is the portion of the program, made up principally of its
screen displays and menus, that communicates information to the
user and instructs the user how to proceed. The user interface,
which is basically the only part of the program that the user per-
ceives, is made up of a combination of non-literal elements.5
In 1980, following the recommendations of the National Com-
mission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU), Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1976 (the Act)
to make it clear that copyright protection is available for computer
programs.' The first wave of cases brought subsequent to the 1980
amendments involved literal, or word-for-word, copying of a com-
petitor's program.7 Courts had little trouble determining that the
4. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1239
(3d. Cir. 1986) (non-literal elements of program are structure, sequence, and or-
ganization), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Broderbund Software v. Unison
World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (user interface is non-literal
element). Although terms such as "structure, sequence, and organization" or
"look and feel" may be colorful, at least some experts find them to be unhelpful
in determining which elements of a program should be protected. For a discussion
of the shortcomings of these titles, see LaST Frontier Conference Report on
Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 15, 20-21 (1989)
[hereinafter LaST Report].
5. See Manufacturers Technologies v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 993 (D.
Conn. 1989) (user interface often described as "look and feel" of program); Pilar-
ski, User Interfaces and the Idea-Expression Dichotomy, or Are the Copyright
Laws User Friendly?, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 325, 327 (1987). This Article will use the terms
"look and feel;" "structure, sequence, and organization;" "user interface;" and
"screen displays" individually and collectively to refer to a program's non-literal
elements, because they are interrelated and because no clear definition separates
them. For example, it is impossible to entirely separate the "look and feel" of a
program from its "structure, sequence, and organization;" likewise, it is impossi-
ble to speak of "look and feel" independently of a program's "user interface," or
vice versa.
6. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028. The Copyright Act
of 1976 is located at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The 1980 amendments clarified the
Act's applicability to computer programs by adding a definition of "computer pro-
gram" and creating a new section giving users of programs the right to create
backup copies and to adapt the programs in order to make them functional on the
user's computer. See id. §§ 101, 117.
7. Menell, supra note 1, at 1048; Clapes, Lynch, and Steinberg, Silicon Epics
and Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for
Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1493, 1052 (1987) [hereinafter Binary
[Vol. 14:1
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Act protected against such direct copying.8 Beginning in the mid-
1980's, however, a second wave of cases began to be brought, alleg-
ing infringement of the non-literal elements of programs.9 Courts
have had difficulty determining to what extent, if any, copyright
law should protect these elements of computer programs. Because
a program's non-literal elements represent a substantial portion of
its development costs and play an important role in determining
its marketability it is important to develop a principled means of
defining the scope of copyright protection in this area.10 The pur-
pose of this Article is to develop such a method.
In June of 1990, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts announced that the copyright of the spread-
sheet program Lotus 1-2-3 was infringed by a competitor's use of
the program's user interface. 1 The Lotus opinion emphasized the
competitive nature of the software industry and brought into focus
the lack of judicial agreement over just what elements of a pro-
gram, beyond the program's literal code, are protected by the pro-
gram's copyright. Perhaps the uncertainty in this area is due to
the fact that those who make law and policy do not understand the
technical elements and workings of computer programs."3 Perhaps
Bards].
8. Binary Bards, supra note 7, at 1052.
9. Id. Non-literal elements can be copied or emulated without directly copy-
ing a program's code. Such elements include a program's screen displays, its user
interface, its look and feel, and its structure. See id.
10. See Note, A Thousand Clones: the Scope of Copyright Protection in the
"Look and Feel" of Computer Programs- Digital Communications Associates,
Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987)., 63 WASH.
L. REV. 195 (1988) [hereinafter Clones] (user interface is single most important
factor in marketability of computer program); Curtis, Engineering Computer
"Look and Feel": User Interface Technology and Human Factors Engineering,
30 JURIMETRICS J. 51, 52 (1989) (user interface is crucial to marketing program);
id. at 56 (over 40 percent of instructions in program are written to implement
user interface).
11. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass.
1990). A program's user interface is made up of its screen displays and menus.
The interface is how the program communicates with the user. See supra text
accompanying note 5.
12. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222
(3d Cir. 1986) (copyright extends beyond program's literal elements to protect
structure, sequence, and organization), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987);
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D.
Tex. 1978) (copyright does not protect input formats).
13. Binary Bards, supra note 7, at 1499.
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it is due to the fact that it was impossible for the drafters of the
Copyright Act to foresee the difficult issues created by rapidly ad-
vancing technology.1' Whatever the cause, it is important to clarify
the extent of protection offered by copyright law to non-literal ele-
ments of a computer program in order to end uncertainty in the
software industry about a significant aspect of programming. 5
This Article discusses the need for a principled means of de-
termining the scope of copyright protection for the non-literal ele-
ments of a computer program. Part I begins by surveying the other
forms of legal protection available for programs, demonstrating
why each is less desirable than copyright. A second Part then pro-
vides a brief explanation of computer programs and the program-
ming process. Part III presents basic copyright principles and doc-
trines, in order to frame a discussion of the issues involved in
determining the scope of copyright protection for non-literal pro-
gram elements. In Part IV, this Article surveys the major judicial
decisions addressing this issue, identifying some of the problems
that courts have encountered with it. Part V discusses the need for
protection of non-literal program elements and refutes the princi-
pal arguments against offering such protection. In Part VI, this Ar-
ticle reviews the successive filtering test, a recent attempt to define
the scope of copyright protection for computer software, explaining
why this test alone is inadequate. Finally, the Article concludes
with a proposal for the adoption of a bifurcated substantial simi-
larity test that integrates the successive filtering approach for
software infringement cases.
14. CONTU, for example, was aware of potential future difficulties: "Most
infringements, at least in the immediate future, are likely to involve simple copy-
ing. In the event future technology ... permits future infringers to use an author's
program without copying, difficult questions will arise." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 22 (1978), re-
printed in 3 COMPUTER/LAW J. 53, 72 (1981) [hereinafter CONTU Report].
15. See Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Screen Displays, 72 MINN.
L. REV. 1123, 1124 (1988) [hereinafter Screen Displays] (until uncertainty is re-
solved, software firms cannot be confident in ability to protect developments);
Nimmer, Bernacchi, and Frischling, A Structured Approach to Analyzing the
Substantial Similarity of Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases,
20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 630 (1988) [hereinafter Structured Approach] (uncertainty
created by ad hoc nature of current computer copyright decisions hampers devel-
opment in software field). For a discussion of the importance of user interfaces to
the marketability of computer programs, see supra note 10.
[Vol. 14:1
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I. THE UNSUITABILITY OF OTHER FORMS OF LEGAL PROTECTION
Although it does have some disadvantages, copyright law has
emerged as the primary source of protection for computer pro-
grams.16 In 1978, CONTU surveyed the available forms of legal
protection for software and concluded that copyright protection
was the most suitable.17 Although copyright law is the primary
source of protection for software, it is not the only available source.
The following discussion briefly examines other available forms of
legal protection for computer programs, outlining some of their
disadvantages, in order to demonstrate that copyright doctrines
should continue to be employed in determining the scope of legal
protection for software.
A. Patent Law
In the most doctrinally pure sense, patent law would be the
appropriate form of legal protection for computer programs. 18 Pat-
ent protection is available for "any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and-use-
ful improvement thereof."'" Although certain fundamental
processes, such as mathematical algorithms, have been excluded
from patent protection on the grounds that they are too important
to be subjected to private control, programs using such algorithms
have been held to be patentable, as long as they do not preempt or
merely recite the algorithms.20 The Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) has implemented procedures for reviewing applications for
patents on software programs and has issued a number of these
patents.2 ' Additionally, design patents, which last for fourteen
years, are available for ornamental aspects of a program, such as
16. For a discussion of some of these disadvantages, see Farrell, Standardiza-
tion and Intellectual Property, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 35, 47-50 (1989).
17. CONTU Report, supra note 14, at 16-18.
18. See Note, Idea, Process, of Protected Expression?: Determining the
Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH.
L. REv. 866, 893 (1990) [hereinafter Process or Expression?] (patent law provides
traditional mode of protection for utilitarian works).
19. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
20. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); see Einhorn, Copyright and Pat-
ent Protection for Computer Software: Are They Mutually Exclusive?, 30 IDEA
265, 269 n.19 (1990).
21. For a listing of some of the software patents issued by the PTO, see
Menell, supra note 1, at 1076.
1991]
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certain elements of the user interface.22 Design patents protect any
"new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufac-
ture. '2 3 On May 10, 1988, the PTO issued the first group of design
patents on computer screen displays, which have been assigned to
Xerox.24 These design patents cover, among other things, design
icons for a wastebasket, a file divider, a broken document, and a
telephone.2 5 Recent action by A.T.& T. to enforce its patent on
software that allows a computer display to run several programs
simultaneously may generate increased interest in the use of pat-
ents to protect computer programs.26
Although a computer program does seem to fit squarely within
the requirements for a patent and a few companies have managed
to obtain patent protection for their software, several characteris-
tics of patent protection make it less suitable than copyright pro-
tection for programs. First, in order to be patentable, the design or
process must not be "obvious."2 " Most programs, which basically
do no more than describe and implement a method of performing a
task, probably would not satisfy the non-obviousness requirement
to merit patent protection. 8 At least one commentator has gone so
far as to claim that less than one percent of all computer programs
are patentable.29
Even if a program were able to satisfy the non-obviousness re-
quirement of the patent statutes, the costs of obtaining a patent,
in terms of both time and money, may prove to be prohibitive to a
22. Menell, supra note 1, at 1091.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1988). An "ornamental design" is one not dictated pri-
marily by functional considerations. Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc.,
806 F.2d 234, 238-39 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also Menell, supra note 1, at 1091.
24. Einhorn, supra note 20, at 269.
25. See id.
26. See Patent Action on Software by A.T.& T., N.Y. Tin es, Feb. 26, 1991,
at C1, col. 6. A.T.& T.'s action also demonstrates the danger of granting broad
patent protection to computer programs. A.T.& T.'s patent will allow it to pre-
clude others from using any form of its process, which has become "vital" to com-
puter work stations, the fastest-growing part of the computer industry. Such ac-
tion will likely drive some smaller companies out of the market, because A.T.& T.
will be able to set the license fee for use of its process at any amount it wishes.
See id.
27. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
28. See Menell, supra note 1, at 1076 (most programs do not satisfy non-
obviousness requirement).
29. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 23
JURIMETRICS J. 339, 357 (1983).
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programmer. ° Before any patent may be issued, the PTO must
conduct an examination of the application; the examination can be
a very costly and time-consuming process.3 1 Furthermore, as part
of the patent application process, the applicant must disclose the
art to the PTO.32 This disclosure would allow public access to a
program's process that could destroy any claim to trade secrecy
protection.3
Aside from the difficulties in obtaining patent protection, sev-
eral characteristics about the nature of that protection make it a
less desirable choice, from a systemic point of view, than copyright
protection. Patent protection is much broader than copyright pro-
tection, which only gives the holder the right to prevent others
from making substantially similar copies of the protected expres-
sion. 4 Patent protection, in contrast, allows the holder to prevent
others from making, using, or selling any device that accomplishes
the same task in the same manner as the patented art. 5 Unlike
copyrights, patents protect against all similar programs or
processes, even those that are independently created s.3 The greater
scope of protection afforded by patent law could effectively pre-
clude competition in many areas of the programming industry,
which strives to create better ways to perform the same tasks. The
shorter term of protection granted to patent holders than to copy-
30. Menell, supra note 1, at 1076 (costs of obtaining patent may not be worth
effort for product with short life cycle); Process or Expression?, supra note 18, at
894 (patent obtained with greater difficulty than copyright).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). The time required for a patent examination
makes this form of protection particularly unsuitable for computer programs,
which have a limited useful life and therefore require quick protection that will
allow them to maximize their time on the market. See Menell, supra note 1, at
1076.
32. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-12, 114, 154 (1988).
33. Although a programmer may not mind sacrificing trade secrecy protec-
tion if he is assured of receiving a patent, the doubtful availability of patent pro-
tection for most programs makes this sacrifice a costly one. The requirements for
trade secrecy protection and the problems created for it by public disclosure are
discussed infra at notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
34. 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01[B] (1990)
[hereinafter NIMMER].
35. Menell, supra note 1, at 1075.
36. See Einhorn, supra note 20, at 270. Independent creation is a defense to
copyright infringement. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 12.11[D], at 12-92.7-9.
Thus, patent protection for a computer program could grant a monopoly, because
it would not permit other programmers to perform the same process, even if those
programmers independently develop a program to do so.
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right holders reflects Congress' implicit recognition that the right
to prevent others from using a process is "a powerful right that
should be granted only for relatively short periods and under care-
fully circumscribed conditions."37
There may be an obstacle to obtaining a copyright registration
for an article protected by a design patent. Copyright regulations
provide that a work will be denied registration if a design patent
has already been issued on that work. 8 There appears to be no
rationale for this limitation imposed by the Copyright Office.39 Ad-
ditionally, there is a substantial question as to whether this regula-
tion is valid. In Application of Yardley,4° the United States Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals held that the PTO could not re-
quire applicants to elect between copyright and design patent pro-
tection by refusing all applications already registered with the
Copyright Office. At the moment, however, the safest course of ac-
tion for a party seeking protection under both copyright and de-
sign patent laws is to register the copyright first, because unlike
the Copyright Office, the PTO has no regulation that denies regis-
tration to a work already registered under the other statute."
B. Trade Secret Law
Trade secret law protects all confidential matter, regardless of
whether it is an idea, expression, or compilation of information.
42
Trade secret law, however, has proven to be an unsatisfactory
37. Process or Expression?, supra note 18, at 895. Patent protection only en-
dures for 17 years. 36 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). Copyright protection, however, lasts for
the life of the author plus 50 years, or in the case of a work made for hire, 75
years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), (c) (1988).
38. The regulations read as follows: "The potential availability of protection
under the design patent law will not affect the registrability of a pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural work, but a copyright claim in a patented design or in the drawings
or photographs in a patent application will not be registered after the patent has
been issued." 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1990).
The regulations present the same obstacle for works protected by an ordinary
patent. Section 202.10(b) provides that copyright registration will be denied to
any work for which a patent has been issued. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (1990).
39. See 1 NIMMER, supranote 34, § 2.19; Einhorn, supra note 20, at 274.
40. 493 F.2d 1387 (C.C.P.A. 1974). For a discussion of this opinion and its
implications for joint registrations, see Einhorn, supra note 20, at 275-78.
41. Yardley did away with the PTO rule to that effect. See Einhorn, supra
note 20, at 277.
42. See Harris, A Market-Oriented Approach to the Use of Trade Secret or
Copyright Protection (Or Both?) for Software, 25 JURIMETRICS J. 147, 149 (1985).
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means of protecting computer programs for several reasons. One
disadvantage is that trade secret protection is largely a matter left
to state law, and it therefore lacks national uniformity.43 The stan-
dards which must be met to qualify for trade secret protection vary
from state to state. For example, many, but not all, states require
some degree of novelty for trade secret protection."
The major disadvantage of trade secret protection is that it
only protects "secrets." Once information is disclosed to the pub-
lic, in whatever form, trade secret protection is forever lost.4 5
Mass-marketing a program without "disclosing" it to the public
presents theoretical and legal difficulties. Although a number of li-
censing schemes have been devised to allow for mass-marketing
without public disclosure, their effectiveness is questionable at
best, and one would be well advised not to rely exclusively on trade
secret law for protection when marketing a program.' 6
It is also unclear whether trade secret protection is available in
combination with copyright protection. At least one court has
stated that the use of a copyright notice with a general publication
is antithetical to the secrecy requirement of trade secret law.'7 Fil-
ing for a copyright registration arguably destroys trade secret pro-
tection, because the Copyright Act requires the registrant to de-
posit the material with the Copyright Office.' 8 It is possible that
the act of depositing material for a copyright registration may con-
stitute public disclosure; the act of filing a patent application
clearly does, because of the Patent Act's disclosure requirements.' 9
43. See id. (trade secret protection available under state law).
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. It is simply impractical to create any kind of clearly enforceable licensing
agreement between the programmer and the consumer forbidding the consumer
from disclosing any of the program publicly. The most popular of these arrange-
ments, the "shrink-wrap" license, illustrates these difficulties. Under this arrange-
ment, the consumer is purportedly bound by the terms of the licensing agreement
when he opens the package containing the program and its manuals. If the con-,
sumer finds any of the terms disagreeable, he is to return the program. The en-
forceability of such an arrangement is far from clear. For a discussion of this and
other licensing arrangements aimed at preventing public disclosure, see id. at 154-
56.
47. Technicon Medical Information Sys. Corp. v. Green Bay Packaging, Inc.,
687 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 411-12 (1988).
49. See Harris, supra note 42, at 158-59. The disclosure requirements of a
patent application are discussed supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
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Another disadvantage to trade secret protection is that the
ability to "reverse engineer" a product can destroy protection
under trade secret law.50 Unlike copyright law, which prevents a
person from producing substantially similar copies of a work, trade
secret law only protects confidential information, and to the extent
that a product can be reverse engineered, its contents are no longer
confidential.5 1 Finally, there is a risk that the Copyright Act will
preempt state trade secret laws. Section 301 of the Copyright Act
of 1976 states that the Act preempts all state law remedies which
are equivalent to the exclusive rights given to a copyright holder
under the Act.52 Although the purpose of this section was to pre-
empt. common law copyrights, it may also operate to preempt trade
secret protection, if that protection is deemed to be "equivalent?'
to the rights granted by the Copyright Act.5 3
C. Trademark Law
Trademark law may provide some limited protection to com-
puter programs, but its value to software is questionable. Trade-
mark law provides protection for the manner in which a program is
sold, not for the content of the program. 4 Protection under the
Lanham Trademark Act 5 5 is limited to preventing consumer confu-
sion as to the source or origin of the goods.5 6 Thus, trademark pro-
tection would only allow the holder to prevent others from market-
ing goods in such a way that the public might be misled into
mistaking them for the trademark holder's goods. Because many
products in the software industry are intended to be lower-cost
versions of well-known programs, the value of trademark protec-
tion is marginal. Companies marketing "clones" or "knock-offs" at-
tempt clearly to identify their products as lower-cost alternatives,
not to pass them off as the more expensive programs themselves.
50. Trade secret law only protects secrets, and any program elements that
can be recreated through examination clearly are not "secret." See Harris, supra
note 42, at 160.
51. Id.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
53. Harris, supra note 42, at 162; see also Luccarelli, The Supremacy of Fed-
eral Copyright Law Over State Trade Secret Law for Copyrightable Computer
Programs Marked With a. Copyright Notice, 3 COMPUTER/LAW J. 19 (1981).
54. Harris, supra note 42, at 150.
55. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051
(1988).
56. Id. § 1114(a).
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Because it is to their benefit to distinguish their clones from more
expensive programs, software competitors are unlikely to commit
trademark infringement, and therefore the Lanham Act is likely to
play a very small role in the protection of software rights.
II. A TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER PROGRAMS
A. The Programming Process
In order properly to understand the issues related to the pro-
tection of computer programs, one must first understand both the
structure of a computer program and the process by which it is
written. The following discussion provides a brief outline of the ba-
sic elements of a program and should in no way be considered an
exhaustive treatment of an area on which volumes have been
written.5"
Section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 defines a computer
program as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly
or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain re-
sult. ' 58 This definition contemplates two basic kinds of programs:
operating systems and application programs. An operating system
is a set of instructions that manage the internal functions of the
computer and are executed directly.59 Application programs are
programs written to perform specific tasks for the user.60 Applica-
tion programs are written in "programming languages," such as
FORTRAN or BASIC, which are easier for the programmer to
work in than the binary code that computers "read."'" Because a
programming language must be interpreted for a computer by an
operating system, an application program, written in programming
57. See generally L. 'PETERS, SOFTWARE DESIGN: METHODS & TECHNIQUES
(1981); B. SCHNEIDERMAN, DESIGNING THE USER INTERFACE: STRATEGIES FOR EFFEC-
TIVE COMPUTER INTERACTION (1987); R. PRESSMAN, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING: A
PRACTITIONER'S APPROACH (1982).
58. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
59. These programs are written in binary code that can be processed by the
computer. See Menell, supra note 1, at 1051. (operating system directs flow of
information among computer's working parts and acts as interface between hard-
ware and application programs); Process or Expression?, supra note 18, at 868-69
(computers only capable of directly executing binary code); Screen Displays,
supra note 15, at 1132 (operating system manages internal functions).
60. Menell, supra note 1, at 1051; Screen Displays, supra note 15, at 1132.
61. Process or Expression?, supra note 18, at 868-69. The operating system
"translates" the commands of an application program into binary code for the
computer. Id.
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language, is used "indirectly" in the computer, within the meaning
of section 101's definition. 2 Because almost all programs on the
consumer market are application programs, this Article uses the
term "computer program" to refer generally to application
programs.
Although there are numerous ways to write a computer pro-
gram, some generalizations can be made about the process most
programmers use. A programmer follows five basic steps in writing
a program: (1) task definition, (2) flowcharting, (3) coding, (4)
debugging, and (5) documentation. 3 A programmer begins the pro-
cess of writing by defining the task to be accomplished by the pro-
gram."4 In order to define the task properly, the programmer may
have to study the problem in detail and learn about the prefer-
ences of the intended user. 5 Next, the computer programmer
flowcharts, or graphs out, the way in which the task will be per-
formed.6 6 As part of this diagraming process, the programmer will
often find it useful to break the task into smaller subtasks and in-
struct the computer to perform each subtask in a logical order."
The process of breaking a task down into smaller subtasks can oc-
cur at any number of levels, depending on the complexity of the
programmer's primary task. 8 There is no single right way to break
down a task, and each programmer may be expected to come up
with a different flowchart, depending on his personal programming
preferences and experiences.6 9 The way in which the various sub-
62. Id. at 869.
63. See Menell, supra note 1, at 1051; Process or Expression?, supra note 18,
at 870-72.
64. Menell, supra note 1, at 1051; Process or Expression?, supra note 18, at
870; Screen Displays, supra note 15, at 1131.
65. For example, in order to properly define the task for a program to man-
age small dental labs, one programmer found it necessary to visit several labs and
interview people there in order to understand the flow and workings of such labs.
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1225-26 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
66. Menell, supra note 1, at 1051.
67. Process or Expression?, supra note 18, at 870.
68. This process of starting from the most general task and breaking it down
into smaller subtasks is generally referred to as "top-down" design. See generally
Structured Approach, supra note 15, at 637.
69. Id. at 870-71. There are, however, some basic limitations on the way in
which tasks are broken down. Generally, programmers will try to structure the
flow of a program to maximize efficiency, use the least amount of memory, and
maximize the speed at which information is communicated to the user. See
Menell, supra note 1, at 1052-53.
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tasks relate to each other and the order in which they are per-
formed can roughly be referred to as the "structure" of the pro-
gram.70 Once the task has been broken down into its component
parts and flowcharted, the flowchart is then translated into "source
code;" that is, it is coded into one of the programming languages.
7 1
In order to operate on a computer, the program must also be trans-
lated into "object code," the binary code that computers process;
this step is generally accomplished by the computer's operating
system.72 After coding has been completed, two steps, remain:
debugging and documentation. Debugging consists of testing the
workings of the program and correcting errors in it, and documen-
tation involves the preparation of users manuals and other materi-
als to instruct the user on the program's operation.73
A unique characteristic of the software industry is its tendency
to progress in a "stepping stone" method. Developers of new pro-
grams often build onto existing programs in order to save time.7 4
The developers of the' Macintosh computer, for example, based
much of their work on Xerox's Star workstation.75 Nationwide
computer "bulletin boards," networks through which users share
programs, have developed.76 One programmer has even developed
a licensing system, dubbed "copyleft," which allows programmers
to borrow software freely for use in other programs.77
70. Process or Expression?, supra note 18, at 871.
71. See Screen Displays, supra note 15, at 1131. For an explanation of pro-
gramming languages, see supra, notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
72. Id. at 1131-32 & n.36. Operating systems are discussed supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
73. Menell, supra note 1, at 1051. Although both of these steps are impor-
tant, they have little bearing on determining the scope of protection that should
be afforded to programs. For a more complete treatment of these two program-
ming steps, see.D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW - SOFTWARE PROTECTION § 2.06[3][e]
(1988); Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 n.21 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
74. See Menell, supra note 1, at 1057 (citing Karjala, Copyright, Computer
Software, and the New Protectionism, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 33, 39-41 (1987)). One
author states that "[t]he computer industry has long been characterized by the
free sharing of programs and program parts among programmers." Process or Ex-
pression?, supra note 18, at 872.
75. Taking the Stand: The Look-and-Feel Issue Examined, PC MAG., May
26, 1987, at 155, 157. One of the founders of Lotus noted, "[niobody does any-
thing from scratch." Schwartz & Rosenberg, Computing the Cost of Copyright,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 1990, at 52.
76. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.03[F][4], at 13-72.
77. Garfinkel, supra note 2, at 57.
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B. Limitations on Programming Choices
Although programmers could theoretically carry out a task in
nearly infinitely many ways, some ways are better than others, and
a number of practical considerations limit the choices available to
programmers. Programmers will generally seek to write programs
in ways that require the least possible amount of computer mem-
ory space, perform the task quickly, minimize the amount of time
required to write, and allow for easy access by the user."8 Because
it will rarely be possible for a programmer to accomplish all of
these functions, programmers attempt to strike a balance maximiz-
ing those factors most important to the task at hand.79 Thus, al-
though certain considerations limit the programmer's choices, the
decision on how to strike the proper balance in achieving each goal
ultimately reflects a creative choice by the programmer.
Because application programs are written largely for the con-
sumer market, a primary concern limiting the programmer's
choices is that the program must be easy to understand and use.
Because the cost of learning a new software system can be signifi-
cant, businesses are very interested in programs that can be
learned quickly and with a high retention rate.80 In fact, the user
interface has been called the "single most important factor" in de-
termining a program's marketability."1 The role of the user inter-
face in choosing a program design has become so important that a
new science known as Computer-Human Interaction (CHI) has
sprung up to study user responses.8 2 As a result, the design of the
"user interface" of a program, the part of the program that com-
municates with the user, represents a substantial portion of the de-
velopment costs of a program.83
78. Process or Expression?, supra note 18, at 869.
79. Id.
80. Curtis, supra note 10, at 53.
81. Clones, supra note 10, at 195 (citing The Difficult Path to the Easy-to-
Use Computer, Bus. WK., Feb. 27, 1984, at 93).
82. LaST Report, supra note 4, at 26. This science, a branch of Human Fac-
tor Analysis, helps programmers find ways to minimize user learning time and the
rate of user errors and to maximize performance speed. Id. See also Menell, supra
note 1, at 1053.
83. See Clones, supra note 10, at 216 (user interface requires substantial in-
vestment of time and money). Over 40 percent of the instructions in a program
are written for its user interface. Curtis, supra note 10, at 56. User interfaces are
often created by a team of engineers, artists, and psychologists, in addition to
programmers. Screen Displays, supra note 15, at 1132.
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III. COPYRIGHT BASICS
A. Requirements for Protection
Copyright protection is based on the constitutional mandate
"[t]o promote The Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." '84 Under this mandate,
the aim of copyright law is not to grant absolute monopolies to
creators, but rather to offer them protection only to the extent re-
quired to advance the public good by encouraging innovation. 5
Generally, copyright and patent laws strike a balance by granting
limited monopolies to allow creators to recoup their development
costs.8 In an attempt further to refine this balance, Congress
passed the Copyright Act of 1976, the current source of copyright
protection. 7 Copyright protection under the Act gives the copy-
right holder a number of exclusive rights, including the right to
reproduce the copyrighted work, the right to prepare derivative
works based on the work, and the right to distribute copies of the
work. 8 Section 117 of the Act contains a limitation on these exclu-
sive rights specifically relating to computer programs. That section
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
85. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (reward to owner is second-
ary consideration of copyright law); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334
U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (primary goal is promotion of public good).
The constitutional goal in establishing intellectual property protection re-
flects a view based on the expression of the great English jurist, Lord Mansfield:
[W]e must take care to guard against two extiemes equally prejudicial;
the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for the ser-
vice of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the
reward for ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be
deprived of improvements, not the progress of the arts be retarded.
Sayre v. Moore, 102 Rev. Rep. 138 (1785), quoted in Damman, Copyright of Com-
puter Display Screens: Summary and Suggestions, 9 COMPUTER/LAW J. 417, 419
n.3 (1989).
86. Without the chance to recover their development costs, authors and in-
ventors would have no incentive to invest their resources into creating new
processes and expressions. Granting more of a monopoly, however, could also re-
tard progress by denying the public access to important works.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1-3) (1988). Section 106 contains a more exhaustive list of
the exclusive rights enjoyed by a copyright holder, but these three are the rights
most relevant to computer programs. See id. § 106. A "derivative work" is defined
in the Act as one "based upon one or more preexisting works, such as... abridge-
ment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted." Id. § 101.
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states that the owner of a copy of a program may copy that pro-
gram for "backup" protection or adapt it in order to make the pro-
gram useable on the user's computer system. 9 The exclusive rights
granted by the Act endure for the life of the author (or authors)
plus fifty years (or, in certain instances, for 75 years).90 When any
of the exclusive rights granted by the Act are violated, the copy-
right is infringed, and the copyright holder may bring an action in
federal court to enforce his copyright.9
Section 102 of the Act lists seven categories of works of au-
thorship which are copyrightable.2 In 1964, the Copyright Office
began to accept registrations for programs under the "literary
works" category.' Courts have consistently held that programs are
protectable under the Act as "literary works." '9 Additionally, the
screen displays of a program seem to fit into the "audiovisual
works" category of section 102, and, for a time, it was common
practice to file separate registrations for the screen displays of pro-
grams under that category. The Copyright Office announced a
halt to that practice, however, in 1988, when it stated that it would
only accept a single registration for each computer program.9 6
Under this practice, one registration is deemed to extend to all
copyrightable elements of a program, no matter which of the seven
classes those elements fall into. 7
In addition to fitting one of the seven classes of the Acts defi-
nition of a "work of authorship," a, work must satisfy two other
prerequisites in order to qualify for copyright protection. First, the
89. Id. § 117.
90. Id. § 302.
91. Id. § 501.
92. These classes are: "(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any
accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures, and other audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings." Id. §
102(a).
93. Comment, Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc. - The Legal
Fiction Created by a Single Copyright Registration of a Computer Program and
its Display Screens, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 536, 542 (1990) (citing 11 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'v 361, 362 (1964)).
94. For a discussion of some of these opinions, see infra text accompanying
notes 133-288.
95. Comment, supra note 93, at 544.
96. 53 Fed. Reg. 21,817 (1988). The Copyright Office advised that a program
should be registered under the class which predominates the work. Id. at 21,819.
97. Id. at 21,819.
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work must be "original" in order to be copyrightable.98 Originality
does not rise to the level of the strict "novelty" requirement under
the Patent Act.99 In order to be original, a work simply must con-
tain independent effort. °10 In addition to being "original," a work
must be "fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression. '" 10 1 Courts
have found that a program capable of being run in a computer is
sufficiently "fixed" to qualify for copyright protection.10 2
B. Limits on Copyright Protection
1. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
Because the purpose of the Act is not to grant absolute mo-
nopolies to authors, but rather to achieve the level of protection
that most advances the public good, the Act and its judicial gloss
contain some important limits on the scope of copyright protec-
tion. Perhaps the most important of these limits in the area of
computer programming is what is commonly referred to as the
"idea/expression dichotomy." Section 102,of the Act states that
copyright protection extends only to expressions of ideas and in no
way includes the ideas themselves. 10 3 It is clear from the statute
that no idea can be copyrighted; to do so would be to give monop-
oly protection to ideas, which from common law times have been
considered "as free as the air and as speech and the senses."104 It is
far from clear, however, just how to distinguish an unprotectable
idea from the protected expression of that idea in a given case.
Judge Learned Hand, the author of a number of important copy-
right decisions, noted that separating idea from expression was in-
evitably an ad hoc determination.1 0 5 The lack of clarity in this area
is somewhat disturbing when one reflects on the fact that just
where the idea/expression line is drawn directly determines the
98. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) (Act protects original works of
authorship).
99. For a discussion of the "novelty" requirement for patent protection, see
supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
100. 1 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 2.01[B]. This standard requires only mini-
mal contributions by the author. See Screen Displays, supra note 15, at 1126.
101. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
102. See 2 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 8.08.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988); see also 3 Nimmer, supra note 34, § 13.03[A][1].
104. Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956).
105. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960).
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scope of protection offered by the copyright laws.10 6
One of the best, and most frequently employed, tests for dis-
tinguishing idea from expression was set forth by .Judge Hand in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.10 7 In that opinion, Judge
Hand set forth what has come to be known as the "levels of ab-
straction test," writing:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the play is all about, and
at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this
series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas' to
which, apart from their expressions, his property is never
extended.'0 8
Under this test, a court begins by looking at the most specific
levels of expression contained in a copyrighted work and moves to
more and more general levels, until the expression becomes unpro-
tectable ideas. 10 9
2. The Merger Doctrine
Closely related to the statutory dichotomy between ideas and
expression is the judicially-developed doctrine of merger. This doc-
trine holds that where the number of ways of expressing an idea is
narrowly limited, copyright protection only protects against identi-
106. See Menell, supra note 1, at 1047.
107. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
108. Id.'at 121. It is interesting to note that this process of moving from the
specific to the abstract is the reverse of the process used by many programmers of
starting from a general task and breaking it down into increasingly specific sub-
tasks. For a discussion of this process, see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying
text.
109. Note that Judge Hand refers to the ideas contained in a work. It is in-
teresting that some courts addressing the protection of computer programs have
felt constrained to define one idea underlying the program and separate the ele-
ments not essential to the idea as expression. This is contrary to Judge Hand's
abstractions test, which recognizes that a work may contain numerous ideas. See,
e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d
Cir. 1986) (purpose of program is its idea and everything not necessary to purpose
is expression), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Broderbund Software, Inc. v.
Unison World,oInc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (purpose of program
is its idea and structure is expression).
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cal copying of the particular expression.11 ° Without such a limit,
the first to copyright one of the few means of expressing a particu-
lar idea would have a virtual monopoly over that idea. Clearly,
such a result would undermine the idea/expression dichotomy, and
courts have therefore developed the merger doctrine to account for
such situations. This doctrine has also been employed to deny
copyright to an expression that is inseparable from the underlying
idea, such that the expression has "merged" with the idea.1 ' The
purpose of the merger doctrine is the same as the purpose of the
idea/expression dichotomy: it prevents monopoly control of ideas
by denying protection to expressions that are inseparable from
ideas.
The opinion in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian'2 demonstrates this doctrine simply. In that case, the
court refused to find copyright infringement by the defendant's
jeweled bee pin, which was different from the plaintiff's only in the
pattern of veins on the wings.113 The court acknowledged that-
there was a great degree of similarity between the two pins, but it
stated that the similarity was no greater than was inevitable from
the idea of a jeweled bee pin." 4 The merger doctrine recognizes
that in instances where the available means of expression are lim-
ited, such as in the Rosenthal case, it is necessary to draw the line
for infringement closer to literal copying in order to avoid granting
a virtual monopoly over an idea to the first to copyright a particu-
lar expression of that idea.
3. Functionality
Courts also have chosen to give only limited protection to util-
itarian, or functional, works. Professor Nimmer notes that this is
because the value of a utilitarian work is in its usefulness, rather
than in the information it communicates." 5 This judicial doctrine
110. See Einhorn, supra note 20, at 271. In ordinary situations, copyright
protection extends beyond identical copying-and also forbids making substantially
similar copies. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.01[B].
111. See Process or. Expression?, supra note 18, at 877.
112. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
113. Id. at 740.
114. Id. at 742.
115. 1 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 2.18[A]-[D]. Therefore, giving broad copy-
right protection to a utilitarian work creates the danger of granting a monopoly
over the useful process. See Screen Displays, supra note 15, at 1130.
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has its roots in the seminal case of Baker v. Selden.1" 6 In that case,
the United States Supreme Court held that the copyright for a
book did not protect the accounting system discussed in the book
or blank forms contained in the book for practicing the system,
because the accounting system was a useful process.11 7 Courts have
used the Baker v. Selden rule to find blank forms, score cards,
time planners, designs of clothing, and other functional articles
uncopyrightable." s
Although utilitarian works are generally not protectable, any
expression that can be separated from such works may be copy-
righted. In National Theme Productions v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc.," 9
the court discussed the line between useful articles and aesthetic
expression, there in the context of deciding the extent to which a
series of children's animal costumes could be protected by copy-
right. The National Theme court began by acknowledging that
costumes generally have "an intrinsic utilitarian function" that
cannot be protected by copyright."20 The court went on to state,
however, that to the extent that they had features which could be
identified separately and which were capable of standing alone as
artistic expression, the plaintiff's costumes were copyrightable.12
The court stated that it was necessary to draw a line to separate
aesthetic from functional considerations in order to determine
which elements could be protected.'22 Although utilitarian works
are generally not copyrightable, the rationale of preventing monop-
oly control over a useful process does not apply to aesthetic, ex-
pressive elements of the article which can be conceptually sepa-
rated from the process. Such elements are therefore copyrightable.
116. 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
117. Id. at 101.
118. See, e.g., Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubies Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452, 455
(2d Cir. 1989) (costumes not copyrightable); Cash Dividend Check Corp. v. Davis,
247 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1957) (forms not copyrightable); National Theme
Prods. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1348, 1352 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (costumes
not copyrightable); Januz Mktg. Communications v. Doubleday & Co., 569 F.
Supp. 76, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (daily time planning chart not copyrightable).
119. 696 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
120. Id. at 1352.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1353. This process is somewhat analogous to the process of draw-
ing a line between the ideas and expression in a copyrighted work. For a discus-
sion of that process, see supra notes 103-109 and accompanying text. See also
Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubies Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989).
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4. Scenes a Faire
Like merger, the scenes a faire doctrine is based on an under-
standing that in some instances, the available means of expressing
an idea are limited, and in those instances, copyright protection
should be similarly limited in order to avoid extending protection
to the underlying idea. The scenes a faire doctrine applies when
many of a work's elements are dictated by the work's subject or
setting.123 Under scenes a faire, stock characters or standard liter-
ary devices that have become inherent elements of a genre are de-
nied copyright protection.124 In a sense, the scenes a faire doctrine
operates in the same way as merger, but it applies in situations
where external conditions, rather than the nature of the idea itself,
impose limits on the number of ways to express the idea.1 25
C. Infringement Analysis
Once the existence and scope of copyright protection have
been established, a copyright holder can recover for infringement
by showing copying. A copyright holder can show copying by either
direct or circumstantial evidence. Because. it is nearly always im-
123. For example, it would be difficult to write about the post-civil war re-
construction period in the American south without referring to the "stock" char-
acter of the carpetbagger. Judge Leon Yankwich, writing in 1951, explained the
doctrine this way:
These cases indicate that when you are dealing with a common idea, no
matter how different the treatment may be, common elements will ap-
pear in both products. In so far as these common elements are distinct,
they amount to creative originality. And, in so considering them, the sim-
ilarities which are traceable to the common sources are disregarded. But
similarities may appear which are inherent in a situation. The French
refer to them as scenes a faire, - that is, scenes which must follow a
certain situation.
Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property, 11 F.R.D. 457, 463
(1951).
124. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.
1980); Q-Co. Indus. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (no unique
expression in modules which would be inherent part of any prompting program);
Plains Cotton Coop. Assoc. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256
(5th Cir.) (factors in program dictated by externalities of cotton market not copy-
rightable), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
125. For example, nothing in the idea of the reconstruction period limits the
choices of expressing that idea. A great amount of writing on the subject, how-
ever, has made the carpetbagger an indispensable element when discussing that
period. See supra note 123.
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possible for a plaintiff to show that a defendant literally tran-
scribed the plaintiff's copyrighted work, courts have developed the
substantial similarity test to allow plaintiffs to establish copying by
circumstantial evidence.126 Under this test, a plaintiff can create a
presumption that copying occurred, thus shifting the burden of
persuasion to the defendant, by showing that the defendant had
access to the work and that the two works in question are substan-
tially similar. 12 7
Because access to a mass-marketed computer program is fairly
easy to establish, infringement analyses in computer program cases
generally turn on the substantial similarity inquiry. Although there
is some confusion over the proper test for substantial similarity,
courts examining literary works generally employ a bifurcated test,
such as the test set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v.
McDonald's Corp.128 Under this two-step test, the factfinder must
first determine whether the underlying ideas of the two works re-
semble each other.12 9 For this first inquiry, called the "extrinsic"
branch of the test, the subject of the two works, materials used in
the works, and other factors are examined using the assistance of
expert testimony to dissect the two works. 30 If similarity of ideas
is established by the extrinsic inquiry, the factfinder performs the
"intrinsic" branch of the test by comparing the expression of the
two works without the aid of expert testimony to determine from
the standpoint of an ordinary observer whether the expressions in
126. See' Comment, supra note 93, at 546; Comment, Copyright Infringe-
ment of Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test,
68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1276 (1984) [hereinafter Substantial Similarity].
127. See Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984,
1000 (D. Conn. 1989); Digital Communications, Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp.,
659 F. Supp. 449, 464-65 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
128. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant's "McDonald land" commercials infringed its copyrighted series "H. R.
Puffnstuff." Id.
129. Id. at 1164.
130. Id. The purpose of this "extrinsic" analysis is to determine whether the
defendant used the plaintiff's work in preparing his similar work. In Arnstein v.
Porter, a case using a similar bifurcated test, the court called on the factfinder,
with expert assistance, to look at the two works as a whole, rather than dissecting
the works, during the extrinsic inquiry. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d
Cir. 1946). Note that both tests compare the similarity of unprotected elements of
the two works at this stage in order to make the initial determination of whether
the defendant used the plaintiff's work.
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the two works are substantially similar.13 1 Although this test may
appear at first blush to be somewhat complex, the thrust of it, and
other similar tests, is to determine from the standpoint of an ordi-
nary observer, whether the two expressions appear to be similar.1 32
IV. JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION FOR NON-LITERAL PROGRAM ELEMENTS
Courts applying the foregoing copyright doctrines to cases in-
volving computer programs have come out with differing results.
These courts have formulated various methods for determining
which, if any, non-literal elements of a computer program merit
copyright protection. The methods employed by these courts have
developed no clear consensus as to the proper approach. A review
of the reasoning of some of those cases will serve to illustrate some
of the problems encountered by courts attempting to define the
scope of copyright protection for non-literal elements of programs.
This section analyzes the major decisions addressing this issue, dis-
cussing the advantages and disadvantages of the approach taken in
each case.
What becomes apparent in examining these cases is that each
court's analysis is flawed. The flaws differ from case to case, but
the problems all derive from the failure of the courts to use the
proper test in analyzing the appropriate level of copyright protec-
tion for non-literal program elements. Although several of the
courts attempt to fashion such a test, none of them achieves one
that is in harmony with the existing body of copyright law. The
problems encountered by these courts would be solved best by the
adoption of an improved mode of analysis described and discussed
in Part VII below.
A. Synercom
In 1978, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas delivered one of the first opinions to discuss
whether copyright protection should extend beyond a program's
literal code in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Comput-
131. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164; see also Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. Note that
for this inquiry, the factfinder only considers the expressions, or protected ele-
ments, of the two works.
132. See Substantial Similarity, supra note 126, at 1280. Because the ordi-
nary observer is the focus of the intrinsic test, expert testimony and dissection of
the works are not relevant. Id.
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ing Co.'33 In Synercom, the plaintiff marketed a structural analysis
program adapted from an early IBM program.3 The strength of
Synercom's program was that it was simplified for the user, largely
through the development of instructional manuals and simplified
user input formats. 3 ' Synercom sued a group of former employees
who developed a competing program that accepted input in the
same formats as Synercom's program, thereby allowing users to
switch programs without any data re-entry.13 6
The Synercom court analyzed the copyrightability of the input
formats in terms of the idea/expression dichotomy. Judge Higgin-
botham noted initially that the plaintiff's instruction manual was
sufficiently original to be protected by copyright and that the de-
fendants had copied the input formats from Synercom's copy-
righted manual.1 3 The question, then, was whether the input for-
mats were part of the manual's expression, protected by its
copyright, or were unprotectable ideas. 38 In order to demonstrate
the nature of the formats, Judge Higginbotham analogized them to
the "figure-H" pattern of an automobile gear-stick. 139 Although
copyright would protect, various expressions of the idea of a "fig-
ure-H" pattern, such as drawings in a driver's manual or prose de-
scriptions of the pattern, it would not extend to the idea of the
pattern itself, according to the court.1 40 Thus, although the copy-
right owner could prevent others from copying his description or
drawing, he could not prevent them from using the underlying idea
of the pattern."" According to Judge Higginbotham, the ordering
and sequencing of data (input formats) was like the "figure-H"
133. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
134. Id. at 1005-06. For a discussion of how the practice of "building" new
programs on existing programs is common in the software industry, see supra text
accompanying notes 74-77.
135. Id. at 1006. The simplified input techniques of Synercom's program re-
sulted in less training time for users and more efficient outputs. Id. at 1007.
136. Id. at 1008. Synercom had protected its input formats with a copyright
notice. Id. at 1007. By designing its program to accept Synercom's input formats,
the defendants apparently hoped to benefit from Synercom's investment of ap-
proximately $500,000 to train customers to use that format. Id. at 1008.
137. Id. at 1011. For a discussion of the originality requirement for copyright
protection, see supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
138. Id. at 1011-12.
139. Id. at 1013.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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pattern and was therefore an uncopyrightable idea.'"" The
Synercom court held that expression could only be protected to
the extent that it involved stylistic creativity beyond sequence and
arrangement.'" 3 The court thus concluded that although the plain-
tiff's manuals were copyrightable, the formats were not.""'
The Synercom opinion represents the lowest level of protec-
tion afforded by a court to non-literal elements of a program. Per-
haps because the infringement claim was based on the copyright
for the plaintiff's instruction manual, rather than the program, the
court more or less limited that copyright's protection to preventing
literal copying from the manual.'45 Although Judge Higginbot-
ham's gear-stick analogy is intriguing, it is not helpful. The anal-
ogy, by giving an example of an idea and several expressions of it
and then comparing the plaintiff's formats to the analogy's idea in
order to conclude that the formats are not protectable, does no
more than arrive at the proposition it assumed implicitly at its
start: that the input formats were unprotectable ideas. The
Synercom opinion denied the plaintiffs protection for formats
which were developed at considerable cost, and which may have
involved creative effort.'4 6
B. E.F. Johnson
In 1985, the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota addressed the issue of protecting non-literal elements of
a computer program by copyright in E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden
Corp. of America."47 In that case, the plaintiff sued for a prelimi-
nary injunction to prevent the defendant, Uniden, from marketing
a program that would compete with the plaintiff's program for reg-
ulating radio, communications systems.'48 In the process of devel-
oping its competing program, Uniden had "disassembled" the
plaintiff's software and studied its structure.'49 When the plain-
tiff's engineers conducted a line-by-line analysis of Uniden's pro-
142. Id. at 1013.
143. Id. at 1014.
144. Id."
145. See id. at 1011.
146. The Synercom court did not consider whether other means of expressing
the sequencing of data were available to the defendants, and so it is difficult to
determine whether the input formats were in fact protectable expression.
147. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D.C. Minn. 1985).
148. Id. at 1487.
149. Id. at 1490. Uniden used flowcharts to accomplish this task. Id.
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gram, they concluded that copying had occurred.15 0 The court eval-
uated the similarity of the two programs in order to determine
whether infringement had occurred."' Under the traditional test
for substantial similarity, the trier of fact is asked to determine
whether the challenged work took enough material from the plain-
tiff's work so that an ordinary observer would recognize that there
was borrowing. 152 The Johnson court noted, however, that applica-
tion of the ordinary observer test to computer programs presented
problems, because the average layman was unable to comprehend
the elements of a program and their functions.'53 Because of these
problems, the Johnson court adopted an "iterative" test for sub-
stantial similarity, which required a plaintiff to demonstrate that
(1) the defendant used the plaintiff's work in preparing his copy
and (2) the defendant's work was an "iterative" reproduction, or
one based on exact reproductions of parts of the plaintiff's work.'54
The court went on to note that in the case before it, substantial
similarity would be found under both the traditional and the "iter-
ative" tests. 55
After concluding that there was substantial similarity between
the two programs and therefore copyright infringement, the court
addressed the defendant's argument that many elements of the
plaintiff's program were taken from pre-existing material, and
therefore the program was not copyrightable.'5 6 The Johnson court
found that although some elements of the plaintiff's program were
taken from the public domain, the program possessed sufficient
originality to be copyrightable.' 5 Finally, the Johnson court re-
jected Uniden's claim that the plaintiff's program was an unpro-
150. Id. The most incriminating evidence of copying discovered by the engi-
neers was that the disassembled code of Uniden's program bore the plaintiff's
copyright notice. Id. at 1492.
151. Id. at 1492.
152. Id. at 1492-93. For a discussion of the bifurcated substantial similarity
test adopted by the ninth circuit, see supra notes 128-132 and accompanying text.
153. Id. at 1493. For a proposal to avoid this problem, see infra text accom-
panying notes 350-360.
154. Id. at 1493. The Johnson court based its test on one suggested in Sub-
stantial Similarity, supra note 126.
155. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1493.
156. Id. at 1498. For a discussion of the practice of using pre-existing mate-
rial when designing a computer program, see supra notes 74-77 and accompany-
ing text.
157. Id. at 1499. For a discussion of the originality requirement for copyright
protection, see supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
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tectable idea.158 The court stated that if other programs could be
written to perform the same function as the plaintiff's program,
then the plaintiff's program was copyrightable expression.159
Although the Johnson court did offer protection to the non-
literal structure of the plaintiff's program, its reasoning does not
offer much hope for future protection of non-literal program ele-
ments. Under the court's "iterative" test for infringement, non-lit-
eral elements would only receive protection when they are in-
fringed in conjunction with some literal copying.1 The Johnson
court chose to adopt the iterative test because it was concerned
that juries would not be able to comprehend complex program
codes. In effect, the iterative test limits the scope of copyright pro-
tection in a way similar to the merger doctrine, but in situations
where the available means of expression are not necessarily lim-
ited.1"' Ease of application is simply not a sufficient justification
for adopting a test that deprives a plaintiff of otherwise available
protection.
Additionally, the Johnson court appears to have conducted its
analysis in reverse order. The court determined that there was in-
fringement before it addressed Uniden's argument that the plain-
tiff's program was an unprotectable idea."8 2 Conducting an in-
fringement analysis in this way creates a danger that juries may
find infringement based on similarity of unprotectable ideas by
comparing two works for substantial similarity before sorting out
the unprotected elements." 3 The Johnson court should have first
158. Id. at 1502.
159. Id. Because a comparable program could have been written without cop-
ying, the court found infringement and granted a preliminary injunction against
Uniden. Id. at 1502-03.
160. In other words, the plaintiffs in Johnson only received protection for the
structure of their program because they had the good fortune of finding blocks of
their program code copied by Uniden. See id. at 1492.
161. The merger doctrine, like the iterative test, draws the line for determin-
ing infringement close to literal copying. The merger doctrine, however, only
draws this line when the choices of ways to express an idea are narrowly limited.
The iterative test has no similar justification, other than the fact that it is easy to
apply. For a discussion of the merger doctrine, see supra notes 110-114 and ac-
companying text.
162. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. 1493-99; see supra text accompanying notes 156-
159.
163. Although the bifurcated substantial similarity test also takes similarity
of ideas into account, it does so only in the extrinsic inquiry, to determine
whether the plaintiff's work was used by the defendant. For the intrinsic analysis,
the finder of fact compares only the protected elements of the tWo works for simi-
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determined which elements of the plaintiff's program were protect-
able and then compared only those elements to determine whether
infringement occurred.'
6 4
C. Q-Co Industries
In 1985, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York expanded the potential for copyright protec-
tion of non-literal program elements in Q-Co Industries v. Hoff-
man.'65 The plaintiff in Q-Co sued for a preliminary injunction to
prevent a group of former employees from marketing a tele-
prompter program modeled after the plaintiff's. 6' The Q-Co court
noted that the only differences between the plaintiff's and defend-
ants' programs were those that arose from hardware limitations in
the different machines the programs ran on. 6 ' The court found
that the structure of the two programs, and a few of their textual
sections, were very similar, and it credited expert testimony that
given the differences in the hardware for which the programs were
designed, this similarity was highly unlikely, absent use of the
plaintiff's program by the defendants.168, The court concluded that
although direct copying was impossible, because the defendants'
program ran on a different machine and in a different language
than the plaintiff's, the defendants did use the "structure and con-
cept" of the plaintiff's program.'69
According to the Q-Co court, the copying of the structure of
the plaintiff's program did not amount to copyright infringement
in that case. Referring to the idea/expression dichotomy, the court
concluded without analysis that the copying of the plaintiff's four
program modules was copying of ideas only. 170 The Q-Co court
noted that there was no expert testimony establishing that the
larity. For a discussion of this test, see supra text accompanying notes 128-132.
164. For additional criticism of the iterative test, see Structured Approach,
supra note 15, at 633-34.
165. 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
166. Id. at 613. The plaintiff's program ran on an Atari 800-XL computer. Id.
at 610. The defendants developed a version of the program to run on IBM com-
puters. Id. at 613.
167. Id. at 613. The IBM-PC that the defendants used had a more restricted
screen display capacity than the Atari 800, and thus there were some differences
in the screen displays of the two programs. Id.
168. Id. at 614.
169. Id. at 615.
170. Id.
[Vol. 14:1
30
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss1/1
COMPUTER PROGRAM COPYRIGHT
plaintiff's modules contained any unique expression, and the court
stated that the same modules would be an essential part of any
tele-prompting program. 7
Although it found no infringement, the Q-Co opinion is signifi-
cant because it recognizes the possibility that there might be pro-
tectable expression in the structure of a program; there simply was
no evidence of any in that case. Also, the court's recognition that if
the program modules were an essential part of any program, they
should not be protected by copyright is an implicit application of
the scenes a faire doctrine, which denies copyright protection to
devices that are standard to a given theme.172 Because the Q-Co
court was deciding a motion for a preliminary injunction, it did not
have a full record before it. The Q-Co opinion, however, contains
some reasoning which could have significant implications for the
protection of non-literal elements of computer programs.
D. Whelan
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ex-
tended broad protection to the structure of a program in Whelan
Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 73 The defendant,
Jaslow Dental Lab, had hired the plaintiff to write a program to
take care of the business needs of a dental laboratory.174 After sev-
eral years of marketing the program for the plaintiff, Jaslow Lab
decided that there was a market for a program that would run on
smaller computers. 75 To meet this need, Jaslow developed a pro-
gram in BASIC, which Jaslow advertised as a "new version" of the
plaintiff's program. 7 The trial court found that Jaslow had in-
fringed Whelan's copyright because the overall structure and or-
ganization of Jaslow's program was similar to that of the
plaintiff's. 77
171. Id. at 616.
172. For a discussion of the scenes a faire doctrine, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 123-125.
173. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
174. Id. at 1225. The program was written for an IBM Series One computer.
Id.
175. Id. at 1126. EDL, the language in which the plaintiff's program was writ-
ten, apparently was not suited for the computers used by many smaller dental
labs. Id.
176. Id. at 1226-27.
177. Id. at 1229. The court was assisted in this determination by expert testi-
mony that most of the file structures and the screen outputs of the programs were
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The Whelan court began its analysis with a discussion of how
computer programs are written. After detailing the steps that a
programmer goes through in writing a program, the Whelan court
noted that the greatest expense in developing a program was at-
tributable to the development of its structure and logic, and not to
the actual "coding" into computer language. 178 Next, the court
turned to an analysis of whether the district court properly found
that Whelan's, copyright was infringed, relying on the substantial
similarity test.'79 The court noted that the traditional test for sub-
stantial similarity called for a bifurcated determination, the first
relying on expert testimony, and the second relying on the jury's
impression as ordinary observers of the similarity of the works in
issue.' Because it found that computer programs were complex
and indecipherable to the ordinary observer, the Whelan court re-
jected the traditional test for substantial similarity in favor of a
single inquiry based on both lay and expert testimony. 8'
In order to apply the substantial similarity test, the Whelan
court next had to determine the scope of copyright protection for
the plaintiff's program. Starting from the premise that copyright
clearly protected the "literal" code of a program, the court ana-
lyzed the Act to see what other elements of a program were pro-
tected by copyright. 82 The court noted that in other contexts, in-
fringement had been based on findings of substantial similarity
between two works, even absent literal copying. 8 3 The Whelan
court saw no reason why computer programs should be distin-
guished from other works; thus, absent some limitation, copyright
would protect the "total concept and feel" of a program to the
nearly identical. Id. at 1228.
178. Id. at 1230-31. For a discussion of the process of writing a program, see
supra text accompanying notes 63-77.
179. Id. at 1232-33.
180. Id. at 1232. For a discussion of the bifurcated substantial similarity test,
see supra text accompanying notes 128-132.
181. Id. at 1233. The court cited Johnson as an example of its new test. Id.
182. Id. at 1233-34.
183. Id. The court referred to cases which based findings of infringement on
similarity of the "total concept and feel" of two works. Id. See, e.g., Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1983). (plot
similarities of two works may be basis for finding infringement); Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977)
(similarities between characters in two works established by "total concept and
feel" of two productions); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121
(2d Cir. 1930) (copyright not limited to literal text).
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same extent as any other literary work.184
One limitation on the extent of copyright protection is the
idea/expression dichotomy.'8 5 The Whelan court conceded. that it
was difficult to separate idea from expression in any principled
way, calling the distinction "elusive.""" The Whelan court chose
to define the idea of a program in terms of the end to be achieved
by the work. 87 Therefore, according to the court, the idea of the
program was its purpose, and everything not necessary to that pur-
pose was copyrightable expression. 8 8 In that case, the court noted
that the purpose of the program was to manage a dental labora-
tory, and because there were a number of different ways to struc-
ture a program in order to achieve that purpose, the structure of
Whelan's program was protected expression. '89 The Whelan court
noted that its formulation gave programmers the most incentive to
develop new programs by protecting the structure of programs,
which represented a substantial portion of programming efforts. 90
The Whelan court acknowledged that its opinion appeared to
be in conflict with Judge Higginbotham's decision in Synercom.19'
The Whelan court noted, however, that it was possible that the
Synercom holding was based largely on Judge Higginbotham's con-
viction that the structure of the input formats in that case could
not be separated from their underlying ideas.192 The Whelan court
cautioned, however, that to the extent that the Synercom decision
held that there was a difference between the copyrightability of
computer programs and other literary works, the Whelan court re-
jected that decision.1 93
The Whelan court correctly identified the need to strike the
appropriate balance between protection and dissemination of in-
184. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234.
185. For an explanation of this limitation on copyright, see supra text ac-
companying notes 103-109.
186. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1235.
187. Id. at 1236.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1236 n.28.
190. Id. at 1237. The court had earlier established that the greatest expense
in writing a program was attributable to developing its structure and logic. See id.
at 1230-31.
191. Id. at 1239.
192. Id. at 1239 (discussing Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Com-
puting Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978)).
193. Id. at 1240.
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formation to promote progress and the public good. 19' The means
adopted by Whelan in order to achieve that balance, however,
have been widely criticized as overbroad.' 95 The principal problem
with the Whelan decision is the broad way it defines the single
idea of a work as the work's purpose. 98 Under this rule, anything
not essential to accomplishing the major purpose of a work is pro-
tectable expression; this determination fails to take into account
limits that may be imposed on copyrightability by traditional
copyright theories and by the practicalities of programming.1
97
Another potential problem is presented by the Whelan court's
abandonment of the ordinary observer branch of the substantial
similarity test. The Whelan court was correct in stating that
laypersons are not qualified to assess the technical components of
computer programs.19 8 The court failed to note, however, that
technical assessments are only required for the extrinsic branch of
the substantial similarity test. 99 The thrust of the substantial sim-
ilarity test remains whether an ordinary observer would conclude
that the works are substantially similar. 00 The intrinsic inquiry,
which is the heart of the substantial similarity test, only requires
the examination of protected expression, and laypersons should be
qualified to assess the similarities between such expression, which
consists of user interfaces and other non-literal program elements
194. See id. at 1235. The constitutional basis of copyright law defines the
purpose of protection as the promotion of progress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. For
a discussion of the constitutional mandates for copyright law, see supra text ac-
companying notes 84-87.
195. See, e.g., Structured Approach, supra note 15, at 629-30 (although
Whelan reached correct result its broad language and sweeping rule may extend
protection too far); Process or Expression?, supra note 18, at 881 (single virtue of
Whelan test is ease of application).
196. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236. For a rejection of the concept that a work
has only one idea, see supra note 109; see also Computer Assocs. Int'l Inc. v.
Altai Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1641, 1650 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (computer program made up
of sub-programs and each sub-program has at least one idea).
197. The Whelan court acknowledged that some similarities in structure
could arise in legitimate ways, but the court failed to devise a means of eliminat-
ing these similarities from the infringement analysis. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at
1248 n.47. For a discussion of some of the limits imposed by traditional copyright
doctrines, see supra text accompanying notes 103-125.
198. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233.
199. For a discussion of the bifurcated test for substantial similarity, see
supra text accompanying notes 128-132.
200. See supra text accompanying note 132 for a discussion of this point.
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that were designed to be understood by laypeople in the first
place!201
E. Broderbund
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California expanded the Whelan holding to apply to computer
screen displays in Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World,
Inc.20 2 The plaintiffs in Broderbund developed a print shop pro-
gram which enabled users to create and print greeting cards, signs,
and posters. 203 After the defendant, Unison World, unsuccessfully
attempted to negotiate with Broderbund for the rights to create an
IBM version of the Print Shop program, the defendant released a
competing program which ran on IBM computers." 4  The
Broderbund court began its analysis by discussing limitations on
the scope of copyright protection, such as merger and the idea/
expression dichotomy.20 5 The court rejected Unison World's con-
tention that the idea and expression had merged in that case, re-
ferring to an existing card-printing program designed for children,
which had different menu screens, as evidence that there were al-
ternative ways of expressing the idea in the plaintiff's program.0 6
Additionally, the court rejected Unison World's suggestion that its
choice of formats was limited by mechanical .and utilitarian con-
straints, stating that the structure of Broderbund's program was
based on aesthetic, rather than utilitarian, considerations.20 7
Turning to the question of copying, the Broderbund court
found enough direct evidence of copying by Unison World to sup-
port a finding of infringement. 08 The court went on, however, to
201. For a discussion of the purpose of user interfaces, see supra text accom-
panying notes 80-83.
202. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
203. Id. at 1129-30. The plaintiff's program ran on an APPLE computer. Id.
at 1130.
204. Id. at 1130-31. During negotiations, Unison World's programmers at-
tempted to faithfully re-create the print shop program on an IBM system, but
after negotiations broke off, the programmers were permitted to make "enhance-
ments" to the program. Id. at 1131. By this time, however, Unison World's pro-
grammers had already finished the menu screens and abut 10 other screens, which
were left intact, in addition to the plaintiff's user interface. Id.
205. Id. at 1131-32.
206. Id. at 1132. The court followed the Whelan court's opinion, defining the
idea of the plaintiff's program as its purpose: the creation of greeting cards, ban-
ners, and posters. Id. at 1133.
207. Id. at 1134.
208. Id. at 1135.
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analyze the circumstantial evidence of copying under the substan-
tial similarity test.2"9 The Broderbund court acknowledged Whe-
lan's new integrated test, but it followed the traditional bifurcated
test, which admits expert testimony to prove similarity of underly-
ing ideas and requires the ordinary observer to assess whether
there is substantial similarity between the expressions of those
ideas.21°
Broderbund shares Whelan's recognition that the proper bal-
ance of protection must further the progress of science. 1'
Broderbund also shares in the Whelan error of defining the single
idea of a program as its purpose.1 2 This broad definition of idea
presents the danger of overbroad protection.2 13 The Broderbund
court has been criticized for misinterpreting the Whelan holding
by applying it to computer screen displays, in addition to program
structure.214 Although Broderbund may have been incorrect in re-
lying on Whelan, its conclusion that any aesthetic expression in a
computer's screen displays can be protected by copyright appears
to be correct, and it is certainly in line with other cases which pro-
tect the expressive elements in functional articles.1 5 Broderbund's
209. Id. at 1136.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 1134 (no danger in this case that copyright will create
monopoly).
212. See id. at 1133. For a discussion of the Whelan reasoning, see supra text
accompanying notes 185-190.
213. See supra notes 195-197 and accompanying text. The test employed by
these two courts can be sharply contrasted with Judge Hand's abstractions test.
Under Judge Hand's test, the factfinder begins with specific, comprehensible ex-
pressions and gradually eliminates the more general, unprotectable ideas from
them. Under the Whelan/Broderbund test, however, a factfinder must begin by
defining the sole idea underlying the work, and then term everything not essential
to that idea as expression. For a discussion of the abstractions test, see supra text
accompanying notes 107-109.
214. See, e.g., Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp.
984, 992-93 (D. Conn. 1989) (Broderbund appears to have misinterpreted Whe-
lan); Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp.
449, 455 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (Broderbund represents overexpansive reading of Whe-
lan). According to these courts and to commentators, Whelan held only that simi-
larity of screen displays could serve as indirect evidence of copying, and
Broderbund misread Whelan to state that screen displays, in addition to program
structure, were protected by copyright. See Clones, supra note 10, at 201 n.52;
Screen Displays, supra note 15, at 1145; Damman, supra note 85, at 425.
215. Although at the time, Broderbund's holding may have been objectiona-
ble in light of the practice of filing separate registrations under the "audiovisual
works" category to protect a program's screen displays, the position of the Copy-
[Vol. 14:1
36
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss1/1
COMPUTER PROGRAM COPYRIGHT
rejection of the defendant's merger argument on the grounds that
there was another program which printed cards in a different man-
ner than the plaintiff's was somewhat inaccurate. 16 Under merger,
the inquiry should have been whether the means of expression
available were narrowly limited, not whether at least one other
means of expression existed."' The Broderbund court took a great
step forward by recognizing that mechanical and utilitarian con-
straints may limit the choices available to a programmer, and
therefore lead to an application of, merger or scenes a faire, al-
though the court found that Unison World's choices were not prac-
tically limited in that case."1 8
F. Plains Cotton
In Plains Cotton Cooperative Association v. Goodpasture
Computer Service,1 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of a plaintiff's motion for a pre-
liminary injunction to prevent the defendant from marketing a
computer program that allegedly infringed the plaintiff's copy-
righted program. In Plains Cotton, the plaintiff sued- a group of
defendants that included former employees of the plaintiff for de-
veloping a personal computer version of the plaintiff's software
system for cotton farmers. 2 0 Because the defendants worked from
a copy of the plaintiff's source code, the defendants' program was
very similar to the plaintiff's on several levels.22 ' The district court
had denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, and
the plaintiff appealed to the fifth circuit.22 Reviewing the district
court's findings, the Plains Cotton court. noted that the grant or
denial of a preliminary injunction was a matter for the district
right Office, implemented in 1988, that a single copyright registration protects all
expressive elements in a computer program seems to validate Broderbund's posi-
tion on this point. See 53 Fed. Reg. 21,817 (1988).
For a discussion of other cases holding that the separable expressive elements
contained in functional articles are copyrightable, see supra notes 119-122 and
accompanying text.
216. See Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1132.
217. See supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
218. See Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1132.
219. 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
220. Id. at 1258.
221. Id. at 1258-59. For an explanation of the difference between source code
and object code, see supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
222. Id. at 1259.
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court's discretion and that the district court's finding rested on its
judgment about the extent of copyright protection for computer
programs.22 The Plains Cotton court declined to define a standard
of protection on the incomplete record before it.224 The court did,
however, state that the fact that market factors played a key role
in dictating the sequence and organization of any cotton market
program supported the inference that those patterns might consti-
tute "ideas. 2 25
Although the Plains Cotton decision is necessarily a narrow
one (the court was .only checking for an abuse of discretion below),
it does contain a significant concept. The fifth circuit's recognition
that external market factors may limit the choices of structures
available to a programmer and thus limit copyright protection is
an implicit application of the scenes a faire doctrine. Under this
doctrine, when the choices of available expression are limited by
the work's theme or subject, copyright protection is also limited. 22 1
G. Softklone
In Digital Communications, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing
Corp.,227 the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia addressed the degree of protection offered by a copy-
right registration for a program's display screens. The plaintiff in
Softklone had developed a cross-talk system, which enabled the
user's computer to communicate with other computers.228 Accord-
ing to the court, the distinctive "status screen" of the plaintiff's
program was a unique element that enabled it to achieve market
popularity.22 9 The plaintiff obtained separate copyright registra-
tions for the user's manual, the program itself, and the main menu
"status screen. ' 230 The defendant, Softklone, developed a "clone"
program which, among other elements, employed the same status
223. Id. at 1257, 1262.
224. Id. at 1262.
225. Id.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 123-125 for a discussion of the
scenes a faire doctrine.
227. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
228. Id. at 452.
229. Id. For a discussion of the importance of user interface elements to the
marketability of a program, see supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
230. Id. at 453. These registrations were granted before the Copyright Office
announced its policy of only accepting one registration to protect all of the ele-
ments of a computer program. See 53.Fed. Reg. 21,817 (1988).
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screen as the plaintiff's program.2 31 Initially, the Softklone court
addressed the protection of a computer program's screen displays
by the program's copyright.2"2 The court noted that although Whe-
lan had stopped short of extending a program's copyright to pro-
tect its screen displays, the Broderbund court had concluded that a
program's copyright did extend to its overall structure, including
screen displays.23  The Softklone court rejected Broderbund's
holding as "an overexpansive and erroneous reading of Whalen
[sic]."'23' Because the same screen display could be generated by
two. or more entirely different programs, the Softklone court con-
cluded that the copyright of a program could not extend to the
screen displays generated by that program. 235
Having decided that the use of the plaintiff's status screen did
not infringe the plaintiff's copyright in the Crosstalk program, the
Softklone court next examined the plaintiff's separate copyright in
the status screen itself. Rejecting the defendants' merger defense,
the court found that the screen display was copyrightable, because
certain aspects of it were unrelated to the way in which the com-
puter operated and therefore constituted expression. 2 31 After a dis-
cussion of Softklone's defenses, the court concluded that the ar-
rangement of Digital's main menu screen was neither an idea nor
the only means of expressing an idea, and that the screen was
231. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 453. The defendant called its program "Mir-
ror." Id.
232. Id. at 455.
233. Id. (citing Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Broderbund Software, Inc. v.
Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986)).
234. Id. In the court's opinion, Whelan dealt only with the evidentiary use of
copying of screen displays. That is, Whelan held that evidence of similarity of
screen displays provided indirect evidence of copying the plaintiff's program. The
Whelan court did not, according to the Softklone court, conclude that screen dis-
plays were protected by a program's copyright. See id. at 455-56 (discussing
cases).
235. Id. at 455. The court reasoned that screen displays are not direct copies
of the literary content of the program. Id.
236. Id. at 458-59. For a discussion on the copyrightability of expressive ele-
ments of a functional work, see supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
The Softklone court distinguished Synercom, stating that in that case, the
input formats which were found to be uncopyrightable were relevant to the func-
tioning of the computer. Id. at 460 (discussing Synercom Technology, Inc. v. Uni-
versity Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (1978)). In the case before it, however,
the court found that the arrangement of the status screen involved "considerable
stylistic creativity." Id.
1991]
39
Tepper: Copyright Law: Integrating Successive Filtering into the Bifurcat
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1991
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
therefore copyrightable. 237
Turning to the question of whether the defendant's status
screen infringed Digital's copyrighted screen, the court concluded
that there was substantial similarity.23 8 Although the Softklone
court purported to employ the bifurcated test for substantial simi-
larity, it made no analysis of either determination, contenting itself
with conclusory statements that substantial similarity between
both ideas (the extrinsic test) and expression (the intrinsic test) of
the two screens existed.2 9
Clearly, under the new Copyright Office policy allowing only
one registration for all of the elements of a computer program, the
basis for Softklone's holding that a program's copyright does not
protect its display screens is no longer valid.2 40 Softklone's recogni-
tion, however, that the program's display screens involved protect-
able creative effort is important. After the Copyright Office's policy
announcement in 1988, the protection that the Softklone court
found available for 'the display screens as "audiovisual works"
should now be available to the same extent under the copyright
registration for the program.24'
H. Cams
In 1989, after the change in Copyright Office policy, the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut ad-
dressed the copyrightability of computer screen displays in Manu-
facturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc.242 While working for the
plaintiff, two of the defendants in Cams had developed a program
called "Costimator," which enabled the user to estimate the cost of
machining a manufactured part.24 The plaintiff obtained copy-
right registrations for the program, the manual, and the screen dis-
plays. 44 Subsequently, the defendants developed a program to
237. Id. at 463.
238. Id. at 464-65.
239. Id. at 465.
240. See 53 Fed. Reg. 21,817 (1988).
241. The Copyright Office stated that one registration under the class that
predominated a computer program would protect all copyrightable elements in
that program, regardless of their class. See 53 Fed. Reg. 21,817. For a discussion
of the different classes of copyrightable works, see supra note 92 and accompany-
ing text.
242. 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989).
243. Id. at 987.
244. Id. at 988.
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compete with the plaintiff's.245 Analyzing the plaintiff's infringe-
ment claim, the Cams court noted at the outset that the extent to
which a copyright for a program extended to its screen displays
was unclear.24 Adding to the confusion was the fact that the Copy-
right Office would no longer accept separate registrations for com-
puter screen displays, stating instead that the copyright for a pro-
gram extended to both literal and non-literal elements of the
program, including its screen displays.2 4 7 The Cams court found
little help from precedent. The only two cases to directly discuss
copyright protection of screen displays were Broderbund and Soft-
klone, and the Cams court found itself unable to rely on either of
these. First, the court stated that the Softklone opinion was of
questionable validity, because it based a finding of infringement on
a separate registration for screen displays.24 s The change in prac-
tice by the Copyright Office now required all elements of a pro-
gram to be protected by one registration, and thus Softklone's
holding that a program's copyright did not extend to its screen dis-
plays .would prevent the protection of any expression contained in
those displays.249 The Cams court was not persuaded by the
Broderbund approach, either, however, stating that Broderbund
appeared to be based on a misapplication of Whelan.s50
Left without the aid of a precedent, the Cams court decided
that a copyright registration for a program should protect both the
literal elements of the program itself and the non-literal elements
of its screen displays, user interface, and structure. 2 1 The court-
found it helpful to create the legal fiction of two separate registra
tions: one for the program, and one for the screen displays.5 2 In
this way, the Cams court found itself able to focus on the copy-
rightable expression of each idea and to avoid confusing the sepa-
245. Id. at 989. There was evidence that in addition to the defendants' gen-
eral knowledge of the structure of the plaintiff's program, the defendants had
photographs of the screen displays of plaintiffs program to work from. Id. at 988.
246. Id. at 990.
247. Id. at 990-91.
248. Id. at 992 (discussing Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Dis-
trib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987)).
249. Id. (discussing Softklone).
250. Id. (discussing Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp.
1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986)). For a discussion of criticisms of the Broderbund opinion,
see supra note 214 and accompanying text.
251. Id. at 993.
252. Id.
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rate ideas.2 53 The court went on to determine that both the "flow"
of the plaintiff's screen displays and certain elements of their lay-
out were protected by the fictitious copyright registration for the
screens.
254
Having set out the copyrightable elements of the plaintiff's
screen displays, the court turned to the determination of whether
the defendant had infringed the plaintiff's. The court purported to
employ the traditional bifurcated substantial similarity test.255
First, the court compared only the non-protected aspects of the
works to determine whether there was copying.2 56 Having deter-
mined that there was sufficient similarity between the unprotected
elements of the works to lead to an inference of copying, the court
then performed the intrinsic inquiry, evaluating the protected ele-
ments of the works from the standpoint of an ordinary observer to
determine whether there was substantial similarity.2 57 The court
ultimately concluded that there was infringement and granted a
permanent injunction.258
The Cams court made a practical attempt to reconcile the
Softklone decision with current Copyright Office practice. Unfortu-
nately, the Cams court's attempt to analyze the literal and non-
literal elements of the program separately served only to demon-
strate the wisdom of the Copyright Office's policy decision that one
registration should protect all elements of a program. The Cams
court hoped that creating the legal fiction of a separate registration
for the screen displays would help to clarify analysis.2 59 The court's
own analysis, however, demonstrates that this legal fiction simply
is not helpful.2"' Because the literal and non-literal elements of a
253. Id.
254. Id. at 994-98. The court's analysis here refutes its claim that creating a
legal fiction of a separate registration will avoid confusion of ideas. The court's
protection of the "flow" of screens could more properly be characterized as pro-
tection of the sequence of the underlying program, and the protection of the lay-
out of the screens as actual protection of the screen displays. See id.
255. Id. at 1000.
256. Id. Under a traditional extrinsic analysis, it is important to compare the
two works as a whole, not just the unprotected elements of the two works, in
making this inquiry. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
257. Id. at 1001. At this phase, the court properly excluded unprotected ele-
ments from consideration. Id.
258. Id. at 1002.
259. Id. at 993.
260. For a discussion of how the court confused protectable audiovisual ele-
ments of the screen displays with the structure of the program, see supra note
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program are necessarily interrelated, it is not possible to separate
them entirely when conducting an infringement analysis.261
Additionally, it appears that the Cams court misapplied the
extrinsic inquiry called for by the substantial similarity test. For
this inquiry, the court compared only unprotected elements of the
works. 62 Because the Cams court recognized that the purpose of
the extrinsic inquiry was merely to determine whether copying
may have occurred, and not to determine infringement, this misap-
plication was probably harmless error.263 At least one commenta-
tor, however, feels that the Cams court mistakenly based a finding
of infringement on similarities between some of the unprotected
elements of the two programs because of its misapplication of the
extrinsic test.264
I. Lotus
In one of the most recent opinions to address the scope of
copyright protection for non-literal elements of a program, the
United States District Court for the District'of Massachusetts con-
cluded that such elements could be protected in Lotus Develop-
ment Corp. v. Paperback Software International. 6 5 The plaintiff
in Lotus claimed that the defendant's program, VP-Planner, in-
fringed certain non-literal elements of its spreadsheet program, Lo-
tus 1-2-3.266 After a thorough analysis of both the constitutional
and the statutory bases for protecting programs, the Lotus court
concluded that neither directly addressed the protection of non-
literal program elements.2 67 The Lotus court therefore turned addi-
tionally to the legislative history of the Copyright Act and to the
CONTU report for guidance, concluding from these that Congress
intended to make traditional copyright doctrines, such as the idea/
254.
261. See Comment, supra note 93, at 537-38 (program and screen displays
related and dependent upon one another).
262. The extrinsic inquiry calls for the court to examine the two works as a
whole in order to determine whether copying occurred. See supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
263. The court explicitly stated that a finding of infringement could be based
only on a finding of substantial similarity of protected elements under the intrin-
sic inquiry. Cams, 706 F. Supp. at 1000.
264. See Comment, supra note 93, at 560-62.
265. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
266. Id. at 42.
267. Id. at 47.
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28
expression dichotomy, applicable to computer programs. Having
decided to apply this analysis, the Lotus court next had to deter-
mine which parts of the plaintiff's program were protectable
expression.119
The court began its determination by rejecting the defendant's
arguments that Lotus' user interface was not copyrightable be-
cause it was primarily functional, like the "figure-H" pattern dis-
cussed by the Synercom court.170 The Lotus court credited expert
testimony that the creation of a user interface required considera-
ble creativity and originality.271 Further, the Lotus court stated
that simply by being "useful," a program did not lose copyright
protection. 272 Rather, elements of expression in a useful article are
still copyrightable, if they can be recognized independently of the
function of the article. 73
Having rejected Paperback's "functionality" argument, the
Lotus court went on to set forth a three-part test for determining
the copyrightability of the elements of a computer program. First,
according to the court, the decisionmaker must define the "idea"
in order to separate it from protectable expression.2  In order to
accomplish this task, the Lotus court recommended using Judge
Hand's abstractions test.2 75 The second step in determining
268. Id. at 54. The Lotus court also noted that leaving trade secret law as the
only form of legal protection for a user interface would be an unsatisfactory solu-
tion. Id. at 56. For a discussion of the disadvantages of trade secret protection for
programs, see supra text accompanying notes 42-53.
269. Id. at 54-55.
270. Id. at 55. For a discussion of the reasoning of the Synercom opinion and
an explanation of Judge Higginbotham's "figure-H" analogy, see supra text ac-
companying notes 133-144.
271. Id. at 56. For additional discussion of the originality and expense that
go into the creation of a user interface, see supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
272. Id. at 57. The court stated that:
It does not follow that when an intellectual work achieves the feat of
being useful as well as expressive and original, the moment of creative
triumph is also a moment of devastating financial loss - because the tri-
umph destroys copyrightability of all expressive elements that would
have been protected if only they had not contributed so much to the
public interest by helping to make some article useful.
Id.
273. Id. at 58. For a discussion of other cases allowing copyright protection
for the expressive elements contained in useful articles, see supra notes 119-122
and accompanying text.
274. Id. at 60.
275. Id. For an explanation of the abstractions test, see supra text accompa-
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copyrightability requires the decisionmaker to determine whether
the expression contains only elements essential to the expression of
the idea or instead contains elements not essential to that idea's
expression.2 76 Third, the Lotus court stated that the decisionmaker
should determine whether those elements of the expression that
were non-essential made up a substantial part of the work.
2 77
Applying this test, the Lotus court characterized the underly-
ing idea of the program as an electronic spreadsheet. 7  Although
the idea of a spreadsheet was not copyrightable, the court stated
that varying expressions of that idea could be protected, noting
that there were already several other programs on the market that
expressed the spreadsheet idea in different ways.2 79 Next, the court
determined that certain elements of the plaintiff's program, includ-
ing the command structure, were not essential to the expression of
the idea of a spreadsheet.280 Because parts of Lotus' program were
not essential to the expression of the spreadsheet idea, and because
those parts were a substantial part of the program, those parts
were protectable. 28 ' Further, the Lotus court stated that because
Paperback's program was substantially similar to the plaintiff's, its
program infringed the plaintiff's copyright.282
The Lotus court attempted to fashion a much-needed princi-
pled test for determining the copyrightability of various program
elements. Although the general ideas behind the court's test are
nying notes 107-109.
276. Id. at 61. This step is similar to the merger doctrine. It is more narrow
than merger, however, because merger also takes into consideration instances
where the expression may not be essential to the idea, but nevertheless the ways
of expressing the idea are so limited that merger should apply. For a discussion of
the merger doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 110-114.
277. Id. at 61. The requirement that a "substantial" part of the work be ex-
pressive in order to deserve copyright protection seems to be a more difficult stan-
dard than the Copyright Act's minimal "originality" requirement. For a discus-
sion of that requirement, see supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
278. Id. at 65.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 68. This is the second step of the court's three-part test.
281. Id. at 68.
282. Id. at 70. The court did not endorse a specific test for infringement,
stating instead that from the perspective of both an expert and an ordinary ob-
server, the works were substantially similar. Id. The court may have found a cir-
cumstantial test unnecessary, because the defendant had stipulated to copying
the plaintiff's program, and the court therefore had sufficient evidence of direct
copying to find infringement without the substantial similarity test. See id. at 68-
69.
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logical, its test as applied may be too narrow. The court's recogni-
tion that Judge Hand's abstractions test may be useful in separat-
ing idea from expression in programs is laudable.283 The court's ap-
plication of the abstractions test, however, fails because it
attempts to define only one idea for the work.28' The purpose of
the abstractions test is to gradually take the work to more general
levels, at which parts of the work will become unprotectable ideas;
thus, the test implicitly recognizes that every work contains a
number of ideas.2 b8 By attempting to isolate a single idea, the Lo-
tus creates the same risk that the Whelan court did of offering
overbroad protection."' s The second step of the Lotus test is theo-
retically similar to merger. Because that test is narrower than the
traditional merger doctrine, it may be necessary to recast that step
of the test.8 7 Additionally, the third step of the Lotus test may
place a greater demand on works than the Copyright Act itself.
Because the Act only requires minimal original contributions from
the author in order for a work to merit protection, the Lotus test
may be too demanding. 8
V. NON-LITERAL PROGRAM ELEMENTS MERIT PROTECTION
A. The Need for Protection to Encourage Innovation
Clearly, some level of protection is required for the non-literal
elements of a program. The non-literal elements are a significant,
perhaps the most significant, part of a program. The user interface
has been identified as the most important feature in determining
the marketability of mass-marketed computer programs.28 9 Be-
cause the average user only communicates with the computer
through the program's menus and screen displays, it is easy to see
why the user interface is so crucial to the success of a program.2 90
283. For a discussion of how this test adapts well to programs because of the
manner in which they are written, see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
284. See id. at 65.
285. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
286. For a discussion of the problems created by Whelan, see supra text ac-
companying notes 195-201.
287. See supra note 276 for an explanation of the differences between the
two standards.
288. For a discussion of the minimal nature of the originality requirement
under the Copyright Act, see supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
289. Clones, supra note 10, at 195.
290. See Screen Displays, supra note 15, at 1132 (typical user's only contact
with computer is through screens).
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A look at history verifies this fact. In the early years of computers,
when the only people using them were computer scientists who
were highly trained in mathematics and engineering, the only
''communication" with computers took place through long rolls of
punched tape.29' It was not until the early 1980's that simpler user
interfaces began to appear on programs marketed to the public.2 92
During the last decade, one writer has noted, the user interface has
become a key consideration in designing programs.2 93 The design of
user interfaces has become so important that the new science of
Computer-Human Interaction has sprung up around it.294
Because the user interface of a program is so important to that
program's success on the market, programmers invest a great deal
of time and creativity in the design of better, easy-to-use inter-
faces. The user interface may even be written separately from the
program.295 Often, the interface is written by a team made up of
psychologists, engineers, and other specialists. 96 Currently, one
writer estimates, at least 40 percent of the instructions in a pro-
gram are written for the user interface.2 97 There is no question that
designing interfaces of this caliber requires the investment of a
substantial amount of effort.29
Although there are some definite goals to achieve, the effort
involved in creating a user interface is not limited to the applica-
tion of mechanical rules and formulas; it involves a great deal of
creativity.2 99 In fact, the choices made by a programmer are gener-
291. Curtis, supra note 10, at 51.
292. Id. at 52.
293. Id. For example, the "mouse," a manual device for positioning the cur-
sor on the screen, was patented in 1967, but it was not widely marketed until
1983. Id.
294. For a discussion of this new science, see supra text accompanying note
82.
295. Curtis, supra note 10, at 62 (user interface design has emerged as sepa-
rate discipline).
296. Screen Displays, supra note 15, at 1132.
297. Curtis, supra note 10, at 53, 56.
298. Clones, supra note 10, at 216. For example, the design of the interface
for the Xerox Star system required about thirty work-years of programmer time.
Much of this time was invested before the computer hardware was even built or a
line of software was written. Id. at 216 n.158. See also Screen Displays, supra
note 15, at 1152.
299. Some of the goals of user interface design include (1) minimizing user
learning time, (2) maximizing speed of performance, (3) minimizing the rate of
user errors, (4) maximizing user satisfaction, and (5) maximizing users' retention
of knowledge over time. Menell, supra note 1, at 1054.
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ally said to be influenced by his training, experience, and individ-
ual writing style.30 0 The way in which a programmer chooses to
break down a task, or the logical "flow" of a program, can reflect a
creative choice. 0 1 At least one commentator has recognized that
the sequence and combination of the subtasks of a program can
represent creative expression. 2 Programmers themselves state
that programming is as much an art as it is a science. 3
Although user interfaces are expensive, in terms of time and
money, to produce, they are quite inexpensive to copy. Imitation
has been called "technically effortless" in the software field °.30
CONTU noted in their final report that the cost of duplicating
software was far less than the cost of creating it.305 In fact, it is
possible to copy a computer program in only a few minutes and to
reproduce as many copies as one wishes. 306
Because the costs of producing a user interface are extremely
high when compared to the costs of copying one, it is essential to
offer some protection to the creative elements of user interfaces in
order to encourage more developments and innovation in this
field. 0 7 Without protection, the author of a user interface would
not have sufficient "lead time" on the market to recoup his devel-
opment costs before imitators began profiting from his creative ef-
forts by marketing programs with similar interfaces. 0 Some pro-
300. Binary Bards, supra note 7, at 1529. Each programmer develops her
own style of expression. Id. at 1535.
. 301. For a discussion of the different ways to break down the task to be per-
formed by a program, see supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
302. Binary Bards, supra note 7, at 1533.
303. Id. at 1538. One programmer described the programming process as
follows:
Writing microcode is like nothing else in my life. For days there's noth-
ing coming out. The empty yellow pad sits there in front of me, re-
minding me of my inadequacy. Finally, it starts to come. I feel good.
That feeds it, and finally I get into a mental state where I'm a
microcode-writing machine .... After a while, you're like a kid on a jun-
gle gym. There are all these constructs in your mind and you can swing
from one to the other with ease.
Id. at 1537 (quoting T. KIDDER, THE SOUL OF A NEW MACHINE 101-02 (1981)).
304. Id. at 1509.
305. CONTU Report, supra note 14, at 22.
306. Binary Bards, supra note 7, at 1509.
307. Recall that promoting the progress of science is the goal of copyright
law. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
308. Binary Bards, supra note 7, at 1509. For a discussion of the importance
of allowing a programmer to recoup development costs, see supra note 86.
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tection must be offered to encourage developers to expend the
effort required to design new interfaces.309 The developer must be
guaranteed sufficient protection to allow him to recover the costs
of developing a unique interface.310
B. The Standardization Argument
Opponents of protection for non-literal elements of computer
programs argue that copying is necessary to foster standardization
in the programming industry. Because the costs of learning to op-
erate a new program are high, these commentators argue that the
public would be better served by compatible user interfaces which
would allow operators to learn new programs quickly.311 This argu-
ment overlooks the way in which most interfaces become "stan-
dards" and fails to take into account some of the costs of standard-
ization. Although it is true that having an industry standard
decreases the amount of used training time, this savings may come
at the cost of locking the industry into an inefficient standard. 2
Once a standard has been achieved, it will likely slow innovation,
because it is difficult to depart from that standard.3 1 3 A good ex-
ample of this problem is the QWERTY keyboard commonly used
by typists today. The configuration of this keyboard was histori-
cally designed to slow down one-finger typists to prevent them
309. Clones, supra note 10, at 216.
310. Binary Bards, supra note 7, at 1500.
311. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 10, at 53 (cost of learning software package
substantial); Damman, supra note 85, at 432 n.75 (costs $1,000 to train worker on
Lotus 1-2-3).
312. Farrell, supra note 16, at 37.
313. Id. Farrell illustrates the problem of departing from an accepted stan-
dard in this way:
[T]hink of a generic Western movie. At sundown, the cowboys are in the
middle of the desert, with no trees to tie the horses to. So does one of
them stay up all night and hold the horses? No, they just tie the horses
to one another, and go to sleep! The horses could go anywhere, but in the
morning they have wandered only a few hundred feet. Why not five
miles? Well, imagine yourself as an adventurous horse, tied to several
others. When you want to explore, the others are eating or taking a nap,
so you yank on the ropes and they say, in horse language, 'Oh, you
wanted to go somewhere? Wait a bit, and maybe I'll be ready to go soon.'
But by that time you are interested in this piece of cactus over there, and
so as a group you never get far.... Similarly, it can be hard for users or
vendors to coordinate a switch from an old standard to a new one, even if
all would like to do so.
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from jamming the hammers of early typewriters by striking two
keys in quick succession. "" This configuration does not promote
speed on modern typewriters.3 ' 5 In fact, studies indicate that the
Dvorak Keyboard System would be much more efficient in terms
of speed and accuracy, but because of training costs, virtually all
companies remain with the antiquated standard.31 6 Fostering
standardization in the computer industry may likewise tie it to
inefficient interfaces and retard innovation.
Because the standard chosen by an industry is not necessarily
the one that is the most efficient, one must question how a stan-
dard can be formed. One commentator has noted that while re-
search and development costs total only about 15 percent of the
total revenues of the software industry, marketing costs account
for 35 percent. 7 It seems logical that the only way for a software
firm to encourage its product to become a "standard" in the buy-
ing community, even if that product is not the most efficient, is for
that firm to expend substantial amounts on marketing that pro-
gram and on training the public to use it.318 Once a company has
set a standard through its marketing efforts, it should not be
forced to share the benefit it acquired through these expenditures
with other companies. Put another way, every programmer is free
to work to make his program the industry standard. The fact that
the public has been "trained" to another standard should not jus-
tify free copying of that standard. 9
Because the creation of a program's non-literal elements rep-
resents a substantial expenditure, some form of protection is re-
quired to encourage innovation by allowing creators to recoup their
development costs. Further, there is no justification for requiring
these creators to share their developments with competitors cost-
free in the name of standardization. There are, however, a number
314. Menell, supra note 1, at 1067.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Menell, supra note 1, at 1065.
318. For example, the plaintiff in Synercom only achieved market success af-
ter substantial investment in training its customers to use its program. The court
estimated the cost of this training at $500,000. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. Uni-
versity Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1008 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
319. If the programmer does not wish to expend the effort to create a new
standard, he is free to negotiate a license with the company that has achieved the
current market standard, or to write an application program compatible with that
company's existing program.
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of limits on the choices available to programmers, and providing
too much protection to creators may give them monopoly-like
power in certain areas.2 In order to avoid giving too much protec-
tion to creators, thereby stifling competition, it is necessary to de-
velop a principled means of separating the situations in which
there are a wide range of choices available from those in which the
choices are limited by practical or mechanical considerations. In
determining the scope of copyright protection, courts should grant
copyright only to those elements of a program that are truly crea-
tive expression. The "successive filtering test" developed by David
Nimmer represents a recent attempt to accomplish this task.
VI. THE SUCCESSIVE FILTERING TEST - A STEP IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION
Courts seem to be in general agreement that to the extent they
contain creative expression, computer programs ought to be pro-
tected. The problem for these courts, however, is separating ex-
pression from idea and identifying instances in which the alterna-
tive means of expression are narrowly limited. Recognizing that
computer programs are difficult for courts and juries to under-
stand, the "successive filtering" approach, developed by David
Nimmer, provides an infringement analysis intended to assist
courts in determining which elements of a program are entitled to
copyright protection. 2' Under this approach, courts are to use ex-
pert testimony to "filter out" unprotectable elements of a program
and then to compare the remaining protectable elements in deter-
mining whether the program's copyright has been infringed. To ac-
complish this, a different copyright doctrine is applied at each
level of the test to remove unprotectable material, ending up with
a "core" of protectable expression.32 2 This test seeks to minimize
confusion by removing elements that are unprotectable from con-
sideration and by conducting the analysis under well-established
copyright principles.3 23
320. For a discussion of some of these limits, see supra text accompanying
notes 78-83.
321. Structured Approach, supra note 15, at 625; 3 NIMMER, supra note 34,
§ 13.03[F].
322. 3 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.03[F], at 13-62.24.
323. Structured Approach, supra note 15, at 635.
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A. Application of.Successive Filtering
1. Idea v. Expression
Under the first step of the successive filtering test, courts are
called on to separate the ideas of a program, which are unprotect-
able, from the program's expression.3 24 Although this determina-
tion is at best a difficult one, courts and commentators have noted
that Judge Hand's abstractions test can be useful.32 5 The "top-
down" approach to computer programming makes Judge Hand's
test particularly applicable, because that test, which moves from
specific expression towards more general levels, simply disassem-
bles a program in the reverse order of the way it was plotted. 26
At this stage of the analysis, it is important for courts to be
aware that a program may contain any number of "ideas. '32 7 Judge
Hand's abstractions test recognizes that a work may contain nu-
merous ideas.2 8 In the past, however, a number of courts have
tried to identify a single idea in a computer program in order to
separate expression from it. 329 This reasoning leads to overbroad
324. 3 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.03[F][1]; Structured Approach, supra
note 15, at 636-40.
325. 3 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.03[F][1], at 13-62.27; Structured Ap-
proach, supra note 15, at 636-37; Binary Bards, supra note 7, at 1568; Process or
Expression?, supra note 18, at 899; Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l,
740 F. Supp. 37, 60 (D. Mass. 1990); Computer Assocs. Int'l Inc. v. Altai Inc., 20
U.S.P.Q.2d 1641, 1651 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
326. See 3 NIMMiER, supra note 34, § 13.03[F] [1], at 13-62.27; Structured Ap-
proach, supra note 15, at 638. For a discussion of the "top-down". approach to
program writing, see supra text accompanying notes 63-70. For a discussion of
Judge Hand's abstractions test, see supra text accompanying notes 107-109.
327. See Process or Expression?, supra note 18, at 901. The writer notes that
"[wihile the possibility that only certain aspects of a play may constitute pro-
tected expression is not at all controversial, courts have unanimously treated the
protection of a program's structure as an all-or-nothing proposition." Id. See also
Clones, supra note 10, at 205; Comment, supra note 93, at 548-49. This writer
warns: "Courts are cautioned that this step must include a thorough analysis of
all ideas which are included in a program-not simply the major idea." Id.
328. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.03[F][1], at 13-62.28 (abstractions
test implicitly recognizes that work may contain mixture of numerous ideas);
Structured Approach, supra note 15, at 640 (same); see also supra note 109.
329. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d
1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) (idea of program is its purpose), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1031 (1987); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 65 (D.
Mass. 1990) (idea of program is spreadsheet); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Uni-
son World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (idea of program is
printing cards).
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protection of all elements not "essential" to the main purpose of a
program.3"' Careful adherence to the abstractions test will prevent
this arbitrary distinction and foster more predictable results.3 31
2. Merger
Once the elements of a program that represent unprotectable
ideas have been excluded from consideration, courts, through ex-
pert testimony, are next asked to identify the instances in which
the available choices of expression are so limited that the merger
doctrine should be applied.332 Where the idea expressed is one that
can only be stated in a narrowly limited number of ways due to
logic or efficiency considerations, merger should- be applied to limit
copyright protection accordingly.33 3 For example, the idea of plac-
ing the file name and cursor status line at the bottom of a display
screen in a word processing program would be denied protection
under the merger doctrine, because the nature of a word processing
program requires the cursor to remain at the bottom of the screen
most of the time in order to allow user to view on the screen what
he has just written.33' Because efficiency practically requires the
cursor status line to be displayed at the bottom of the screen in
that instance, merger would apply. When applying merger, it is im-
portant for courts, with expert assistance, to recognize when
choices are limited for all practical purposes. Although an infinite
number of ways may theoretically be available to express an idea,
considerations of efficiency may make all but a few of these choices
impractical; and merger should be applied in such instances.33 5 Ex-
pert testimony should help to clarify when efficiency considera-
tions really do impose practical limitations on expression. The
330. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
331. Although, inevitably, as in all other copyright cases, drawing the idea/
expression line will be an "ad hoc" determination. See supra text accompanying
note 105.
332. 3 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.03[F][2]; Structured Approach, supra
note 15, at 640-42. For a discussion of the merger doctrine, see supra text accom-
panying notes 110-114.
333. 3 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.03[F][2], at 13-63, 13-65; Structured Ap-
proach, supra note 15, at 640-42. For a discussion of some of these limits, see
supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
334. Damman, supra note 85, at 430.
335. See 3 NIMMER supra note 34, § 13.03[F][2], at 13-64. As Nimmer states,
the fact that two programs use the most efficient method of achieving a result
should not be evidence of copying. Id.
1991]
53
Tepper: Copyright Law: Integrating Successive Filtering into the Bifurcat
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1991
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
merger doctrine should not be applied so broadly that only ineffi-
cient means of achieving a result are protected.-3"
3. Scenes a Faire
In the next step of the successive filtering test, courts should
exclude program elements that are dictated by external considera-
tions.33 7 This step of the analysis can be equated to the scenes a
faire doctrine, which denies copyright protection to elements that
are an inherent part of a work's theme, or that are standard de-
vices used in expressing that theme.3 In this step, courts, again
with expert assistance, should exclude elements of a program that
are dictated by standard computing techniques. 3 9 Elements ex-
cluded by this step include any choices dictated by hardware stan-
dards, manufacturers' standards, or standards which have in fact
become widely shared among programmers.34
4. Public Domain
Because material in the public domain is not protected even
when integrated into a copyrighted work, it is excluded from con-
sideration at this stage of the test.341 This phase of the test is espe-
336. Cf. Menell, supra note 1, at 1086-87. Menell contends that only ineffi-
cient programming methods should be protectable, but he acknowledges that this
brings about the perverse result of requiring a plaintiff to argue that his program
is inefficient in order to receive copyright protection. Id.
The mere fact that a program is efficient should not disqualify it from protec-
tion. Only where efficiency demands one of a narrow range of choices should
merger apply. If other means are less efficient, but still practical, merger should
not apply. Expert testimony will be especially important in identifying those situ-
ations in which efficiency and other concerns really do impose narrow limits on
the choices of expression.
337. 3 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.03[F][3]; Structured Approach, supra
note 15, at 642-48.
338. For a discussion of the scenes a faire doctrine, see supra notes 123-125
and accompanying text.
339. 3 NIMMER, supra note 35, § 13.03[F][3], at 13-65; Structured Approach,
supra note 15, at 642-43. Nimmer notes that in certain situations, it is nearly
impossible to write a program without using techniques which are standard for
implementing a certain function. Id. The Plains Cotton court also recognized that
programming choices dictated by external market considerations should not be
protected. Plains Cotton Coop. Assoc. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d
1256, 1262 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
340. For a more complete listing of excludable elements, see 3 NIMMER, supra
note 34, § 13.03[F][3].
341. 3 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.03[F][4]; Structured Approach, supra
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cially important, because of the "stepping stone" method of devel-
opment in the software industry.342 Because programmers often
share ideas and build on existing routines, itshould not be unusual
to find some similarities between programs incorporating "bor-
rowed" parts.343 Careful exclusion of those borrowed elements
which are not protected by copyright will avoid the possibility that
a court will find infringement based on similarities between the
unprotected portions of two programs.
B. Problems with Successive Filtering
Although the successive filtering approach does have the ad-
vantage of allowing courts to employ familiar copyright doctrines
when conducting an infringement analysis, the test by itself creates
some potential difficulties and sacrifices unnecessarily some of the
advantages of the traditional bifurcated test for substantial simi-
larity. The interaction between courts and expert witnesses called
for by the successive filtering approach creates the danger of too
much reliance on expert testimony. Because successive filtering
calls for a single inquiry into substantial similarity, it will be diffi-
cult for courts to exclude expert opinions on substantial similarity
between the "core" protected elements of programs after relying
on expert testimony to sift out the .unprotected elements. The
workings of computer programs can be complex and difficult for a
court to understand. The court in Q-Co Industries v. Hoffman,344
discussed in Part IV above, for example, openly acknowledged the
difficulties it had in comprehending the technical workings of com-
puter programs. 45 It is therefore quite conceivable that a court
might be tempted to abdicate its decisionmaking responsibility en-
tirely and rely instead on expert testimony, especially after exten-
sively employing such testimony for successive filtering. The opin-
ion in E.F. Johnson v. Uniden Corp. of America, 4 ' analyzed and
criticized above in Part IV, provides an example of this sort of
danger. Although it did not totally abdicate its decisionmaking re-
note 15, at 648-49.
342. For a discussion of the practice of building new programs on pre-ex-
isting ones, see supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
343. 3 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.03[F][4].
344. 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
345. The court stated that "[t]he challenge to counsel to make comprehensi-
ble for the court the esoterica of bytes and modules is daunting." Q-Co, 625 F.
Supp. at 610.
346. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
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sponsibility, the Johnson court did adopt a test that significantly
limited the scope of protection available to non-literal program ele-
ments because it found that the ordinary observer test was difficult
to apply. 47 Once a court justifies effectively limiting the scope of
legal protection on the grounds that determining the proper scope
is a difficult process, it is a small step for that court to turn the
decision entirely over to the experts, because that process is even
easier.
Even courts that are conscientious and attempt to make an
independent comparison of the protected elements of programs for
substantial similarity face the danger of being confused or influ-
enced by similarities encountered during successive filtering or of
being sub-consciously influenced by the expert opinions those
courts relied on in performing successive filtering. Courts are obvi-
ously influenced by expert testimony, and it may be difficult for a
court that has heard such testimony to credit it for one part of
successive filtering, but disregard it for another part of the same
inquiry. 48 The opinion in Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. V.
Cams, Inc.,349 discussed in Part IV above, demonstrates how a
court can become confused and possibly influenced by expert testi-
mony on similarity of unprotected program elements. Although it
purported to base its finding of infringement solely on the similari-
ties between the protectable elements of the programs at issue, the
Cams court appears not to have managed to do so.350 In spite of its
intentions to the contrary, the Cams court based its finding of in-
fringement partially on similarities between elements that the
court found to be unprotected.351 The Cams court had a clear un-
derstanding of the applicable law; it was simply confused by the
complexity of the factual situation, and its inclusion of unprotect-
347. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1493. For a discussion of the test adopted by
the Johnson court and its effects on copyright protection, see supra text accom-
panying notes 153-164.
348. Courts naturally place reliance on expert testimony in such a 'complex
area. See, e.g., Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1246 (court relied on plaintiff's expert for
test); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 56 (D. Mass.
1990) (relying on expert testimony on creation of user interfaces); Manufacturers
Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 994 (D. Conn. 1989) (crediting
plaintiff's four experts over defendant's expert).
349. 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989).
350. The court stated that a finding of infringement could be based only on a
finding of substantial similarity between the protected elements of the programs.
Cams, 706 F. Supp. at 1000.
351. See Comment, supra note 93, at 560-62.
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able elements in its finding of infringement indicates that the court
was influenced sub-consciously by the expert testimony on the sim-
ilarities of these unprotected elements.
Additionally, the successive filtering approach loses the proper
"ordinary observer" focus of the bifurcated substantial similarity
test. Because it calls for a single inquiry into substantial similarity
that relies heavily on expert testimony, the successive filtering ap-
proach fails to focus the ultimate determination of substantial sim-
ilarity on the ordinary observer. The ordinary observer standard
was specifically designed for literary works, such as computer pro-
grams.3 52 Dissecting a program with expert assistance is inconsis-
tent with allowing the factfinder to view the non-literal elements of
that program as they were intended to run. Because a program's
non-literal elements are designed largely to make the program
comprehensible to the ordinary observer, the substantial similarity
inquiry for those elements should be conducted from the stand-
point of their intended audience, the ordinary observer. The bifur-
cated test carefully maintains this focus; successive filtering alone
does not.
VII. INTEGRATING SUCCESSIVE FILTERING INTO THE BIFURCATED
TEST
In order to address these problems, a modification of the suc-
cessive filtering approach is required. Successive filtering should be
integrated into the traditional bifurcated substantial similarity in-
quiry, allowing courts to benefit from the advantages of both.
Computer programs are literary works, and the bifurcated test was
designed for the evaluation of literary works.353 Unlike other liter-
ary works, however, programs can be "read" on two levels. The
"look and feel" of a program, its external workings perceived by
the user, is one level of operation. Beneath this "look and feel,"
however, lies a complex set of programming commands, incompre-
hensible to the ordinary user.35" Both levels can be "read," but by
very different audiences. By maintaining both inquiries of the bi-
furcated test, but allowing the group qualified to make each in-
quiry to do so, courts can keep the advantages of the bifurcated
352. See supra text accompanying notes 128-132.
353. See supra text accompanying notes 128-132 for a discussion of the de-
velopment of the bifurcated test.
354. For a discussion of source and object codes, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 71-72.
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test. The extrinsic inquiry should be made by courts using the as-
sistance of experts possessing the requisite knowledge to analyze
the underlying ideas and workings of programs. The intrinsic in-
quiry, as in any other literary infringement case, should be per-
formed by the jury, from the standpoint of an ordinary observer.
Successive filtering should be employed by the court between these
two steps to assure that only protectable elements are examined by
the jury. Using successive filtering ensures that this can be done
without confusing or misleading the jury with expert testimony.
Integrating the successive filtering test into the traditional bifur-
cated substantial similarity inquiry should thus lead to more prin-
cipled and accurate decisionmaking in the protection of computer
programs. 55
A. Application of the Integrated Substantial Similarity Test
Under this integrated approach, a three-step process emerges.
First, courts should perform the extrinsic branch of the traditional
test, comparing the two works as a whole in order to determine
whether the ideas of the works are similar in such a way that it
appears the protected work was used in preparing the second
work.3 56 Expert testimony should be employed for this inquiry, be-
cause the ordinary trier of fact would not be qualified to tell from
looking at two sets of code whether they were based on the same
ideas. 31 Thus, courts should turn to qualified experts for the de-
termination under the extrinsic branch of the test. Relying on ex-
perts at this stage of the test does not remove the ultimate decision
from the jury, because the purpose of the extrinsic branch of the
test is merely to make the preliminary determination of whether
there is sufficient similarity between the underlying themes and
ideas of the two works to conclude that the first work was con-
sulted in preparing the second work. 35 8
Next, if a court concludes, based on expert testimony, that the
ideas behind that two works in issue are similar, the court should
apply the successive filtering process to sift out unprotectable ele-
355. For a discussion of the bifurcated substantial similarity test, see supra
text accompanying notes 128-132.
356. Both the protected and unprotected elements of the works are consid-
ered at this phase of the inquiry. See supra note 130.
357. See Comment, supra note 93, at 548.
358. For a discussion of this point, see supra note 130.
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ments.359 The application of various copyright law doctrines by
successive filtering will remove elements which are not protected
and leave a core of protectable material. 3"° The court should again
turn to qualified experts for this process to ensure accurate deci-
sions. Exclusion of the jury from this phase ensures that the jury
will not be influenced by permissible similarities between the un-
protected elements of the works when making the ultimate deter-
mination on infringement.3 '
After experts have assisted the court in applying successive fil-
tering, the protectable "core" should be submitted to the factfinder
for a determination under the intrinsic analysis of whether, from
the standpoint of an ordinary observer, the two works appear to be
substantially similar.362 This intrinsic analysis could be conducted
by an examination of the screen displays, menus, flowcharts, or any
other manifestation of the program's non-literal elements that
would be comprehensible to the average user. The factfinder is
qualified to make this determination, because any similarity in
non-literal elements should be perceptible to the ordinary ob-
server.3 63 In fact, the purpose of the ordinary observer standard is
to assure that a finding of infringement is based on a comparison
of the works as they would be viewed by their intended audience.
Thus, the jury is actually in a better position than experts are to
make this determination.
B. Advantages of the Integrated Test
Integrating successive filtering into the bifurcated substantial
similarity test has several important advantages. The principal ad-
vantage of this approach is that it resolves the problems encoun-
tered by courts addressing the copyrightability of non-literal ele-
ments of computer programs. Each of the difficulties encountered
by the opinions discussed above in Part IV would be avoided
through application of the integrated approach.3 4 Additionally,,
359. See supra notes 321-343 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
process.
360. 3 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.03[F].
361. See infra text accompanying notes 366-369.
362. For a discussion of the intrinsic analysis, see supra text accompanying
notes 131-132.
363. Indeed, the user interface is so crucial to a program precisely because it
is comprehensible to the ordinary observer.
364. For a discussion of how the integrated approach avoids these problems,
see infra text accompanying notes 370-401.
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the integrated approach alleviates some of the difficulties encoun-
tered in applying the traditional bifurcated test to computer pro-
grams by modifying that test to suit the nature of the inquiries
involved in the analysis of computer programs.
The integrated approach allows courts, experts, and juries
each to make the determinations they are uniquely qualified to
make. Because the internal workings of computer programs are in-
comprehensible to the average factfinder, the extrinsic branch of
this test, which calls for examination of those workings, should be
performed by the court, with the aid of expert testimony. Because
of the special complexity of the extrinsic analysis in computer
cases, excluding the jury from that phase in such cases minimizes
the danger of confusing the jury and relieves experts of the burden
of attempting to make their dissections comprehensible to the trier
of fact. Dissection and analysis of the work by experts has always
been proper under the extrinsic branch of the traditional bifur-
cated test, and the integrated approach merely continues this prac-
tice by allowing experts to make this determination indepen-
dently. 65 Additionally, because experts are qualified to identify
those instances in which programming choices are limited or dic-
tated by external considerations, their assistance is invaluable in
applying successive filtering. Because the court, however, is the
body familiar with the workings of traditional copyright doctrines,
the court directs the successive filtering, applying the relevant doc-
trines to the factual situation as explained by the experts. Finally,
the jury or factfinder retains its traditional role, making the ulti-
mate factual determination of infringement under the ordinary ob-
server standard. Because the jury is able to perceive any similari-
ties between protected non-literal elements that would be
discernible to the ordinary observer, the jury is uniquely qualified
to make this determination.
Even in simple cases, application of the traditional bifurcated
substantial similarity test can be confusing to a jury, because it
requires the jury to -utilize expert testimony for the extrinsic
branch and then somehow to "forget" that testimony for the in-
trinsic branch. 366 This difficulty is compounded in software in-
365. See supra text accompanying notes 129-130 for an explanation of the
role of experts in the traditional bifurcated test.
366. Expert testimony is proper under the extrinsic branch of the traditional
bifurcated test, but the intrinsic branch must be performed by the jury alone
from the standpoint of an ordinary observer. See supra text accompanying notes
128-132.
[Vol. 14:1
60
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss1/1
COMPUTER PROGRAM COPYRIGHT
fringement cases, where expert testimony must be extensively em-
ployed to make the workings of complex programs comprehensible
to the jury. In such cases, the jury is likely to be unable to "forget"
the testimony of experts on this seemingly arcane subject when
performing the inquiry called for by the intrinsic branch of the
test. The court in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc.,3" ' discussed and criticized in Part IV above, recognized this
difficulty and cited it as a justification for abandoning the bifur-
cated test in software infringement cases.38 8 The single inquiry
adopted by the Whelan court and the single inquiry called for
under successive filtering, however, avoid this difficulty only at the
expense of creating a danger of undue reliance on expert testi-
mony.3 9 By compartmentalizing the two inquiries called for by the
traditional bifurcated substantial similarity test and requiring each
to be made independently by a different decisionmaker, the inte-
grated approach avoids both of these dangers. The integrated ap-
proach relieves the jury of the burden of performing the mental
gymnastics called for by the traditional bifurcated test and also
avoids the problem of placing the jury in a position where it might
be overwhelmed or unduly influenced by expert opinion. When the
factfinder is called on to make the infringement determination
under the intrinsic branch of the integrated test, it will be exposed
only to the protected elements of each work. Thus, there is no dan-
ger that the factfinder will be influenced or misled by any permis-
sible similarities between the unprotected elements of the works or
by the expert analysis that eliminated those elements from further
consideration.
Integrating successive filtering into the substantial similarity
inquiry also solves the problems encountered by courts addressing
the extent of copyright protection for non-literal program ele-
ments. Most importantly, perhaps, the integrated approach pre-
vents courts from creating arbitrary definitions of the unprotect-
able ideas in each case. Because the way in which ideas are defined
directly determines the scope of copyright protection for a work, it
is important to have a principled means of identifying those
367. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986)i cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
368. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232-33. For a discussion of this opinion, see supra
text accompanying notes 173-201.
369. For a discussion of the danger of expert opinions overwhelming
factfinders, see supra text accompanying notes 346-348. Successive filtering may
not even avoid this danger. See id.
1991]
61
Tepper: Copyright Law: Integrating Successive Filtering into the Bifurcat
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1991
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
ideas. 370 In the past, however, courts have taken this task upon
themselves, often identifying only one idea in a program and
thereby extending potentially overbroad protection to that pro-
gram. 371 Because successive filtering calls for experts to carefully
apply the abstractions test in order to separate out the ideas at
each level of a program, its inclusion in the integrated test helps to
ensure that copyright protection will only extend to the elements
of a program that are truly creative expression.372 The abstractions
test recognizes that a literary work may contain any number of
ideas, and careful application of that test under the integrated ap-
proach provides a principled means of identifying those ideas.
373
The opinion in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Com-
puting Co.,374 discussed and criticized in Part IV above, demon-
strates that courts alone are unable to comprehend the workings of
software programs and the nature of their elements.3 75 The
Synercom court attempted to analyze input formats on its own by
analogizing them to something more familiar to the court, namely
the "figure H" pattern for a gear stick.376 Unfortunately, analogies
of this sort tend to be circular; the ultimate outcome of the case is
determined by the characteristics of the familiar item, rather than
those of the item at issue.377 The Lotus court recognized that anal-
ogies can be misleading, if not carefully applied. 37 The integrated
370. See supra text accompanying notes 329-331 for a discussion on the im-
portance of defining the ideas in a work properly.
371. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d
1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) (idea of program is its purpose), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1031 (1987); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 65 (D.
Mass. 1990) (idea of program is spreadsheet); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Uni-
son World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (idea of program is
printing cards).
372. For an explanation of the use of the abstractions test in successive filter-
ing, see supra text accompanying notes 328-331.
373. For a discussion of why the abstractions test is particularly well-suited
to software infringement cases, see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
374. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
375. For a discussion of the Synercom opinion and a critical analysis of its
reasoning, see supra text accompanying notes 133-146..
376. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013.
377. See text accompanying notes 145-146 for a discussion of how this prob-
lem occurred in Synercom.
378. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 71-73 (D.
Mass. 1990). The Lotus court had this to say about analogies: "They are not to be
mistaken . . . for logically compelled inferences from authoritative declarations."
Id. at 71.
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approach avoids this danger by relying on expert testimony to
identify the characteristics of each program element during succes-
sive filtering and to preserve those which contain protectable ex-
pression. By utilizing expert testimony during the successive filter-
ing portion of. the inquiry, the integrated approach allows
determinations to be made based on the nature of the program ele-
ments themselves, not on the nature of whatever item the court
chooses to compare them to.
Because of the large amount of material in programs taken
from the public domain, it is especially important to exclude un-
protectable elements before considering whether infringement oc-
curred.3 79 The court's decision in E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden
Corp. of America,3 s discussed above in Part IV, demonstrates how
courts abandoning the bifurcated test can erroneously base a find-
ing of infringement at least partially on permissible similarities be-
tween unprotected program elements.38 1 The Johnson court ap-
pears to have conducted its analysis in reverse order, finding
infringement first, and then eliminating unprotectable elements
from consideration. 82 By carefully eliminating all but the pro-
tected "core" of a program from consideration before the jury
views it, the integrated approach will eliminate this danger. 38 3
Several courts addressing copyright protection for computer
programs have noted, quite properly, that external considerations
should limit the extent to Which certain non-literal elements
should be protected. The court in Plains Cotton Cooperative Asso-
ciation v. Goodpasture Computer Service,384 discussed in Part IV
above, for example, stated that programming choices dictated by
considerations of the program's subject, the cotton market, did not
merit protection.38 5 Also, the court in Q-Co Industries v. Hoff-
379. For a discussion of the "stepping stone" method of programming, by
which new programs incorporate public domain elements of previously-existing
programs, see supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
380. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D.C. Minn. 1985).
381. For a discussion of the Johnson opinion, see supra text accompanying
notes 147-164.
382. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1493-99.
383. For a discussion of how this approach will also avoid the more subtle
danger under the traditional bifurcated test that the factfinder will be influenced
by similarities between unprotected elements viewed during the extrinsic branch
of the test, see supra text accompanying notes 366-369.
384. 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
385. Plains Cotton, 807 F.2d at 1262. For a discussion and analysis of this
opinion, see supra text accompanying notes 219-226.
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man, 38 6 discussed and criticized in Part IV above, stated that to
the extent that certain modules would be present in any tele-
prompting program, those modules could not be protected by
copyright.387 These statements are, at least implicitly, attempts to
apply the same policies that underlie the merger and scenes a faire
doctrines of copyright law.388 These courts, however, have failed to
conduct their analyses under traditional copyright doctrines, lead-
ing to less effective implementation of the policies behind those
doctrines. For example, the Q-Co court conducted no analysis of
the issue of whether the plaintiff's program modules contained any
unique expression, or whether all of the elements of those modules
would in fact exist in every tele-prompting program. Instead, the
court noted that the plaintiff had not introduced any expert testi-
mony on the issue.3 89 Thus, although the Q-Co court recognized
that external considerations could limit copyright protection in
certain instances, it failed to evaluate the significance of such ex-
ternal considerations in the case before it, as required by both
merger and scenes a faire;'instead, the court placed that burden on
the plaintiff. The integrated approach places the burden on the
court to identify and consider the protected elements of each work,
rather than forcing the plaintiff to justify them through expert tes-
timony. By carefully adhering to traditional copyright doctrines
and using expert assistance, the integrated approach isolates the
protectable expression in a software program, rather than speculat-
ing on which elements are protectable.
Even courts which recognize traditional copyright doctrines
may have difficulty applying them to computer programs, because
courts lack a proper understanding of the practical realities of pro-
gramming. The opinion in Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison
World, Inc.,390 discussed and criticized above, demonstrates this
difficulty.3 9' The Broderbund court rejected the defendant's argu-
386. 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
387. Q-Co, 625 F. Supp. at 616. This opinion is discussed supra text accom-
panying notes 165-172.
388. Merger and scenes a faire both operate to limit copyright protection in
situations where the choices available to the creator are limited, thereby prevent-
ing the extension of copyright protection to ideas. For a discussion of these doc-
trines, see supra text accompanying notes 110-114, 123-125.
389. Q-Co, 625 F. Supp. at 616.
390. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
391. For a discussion of this opinion, see supra text accompanying notes 202-
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ment that merger should apply, stating that the fact that another
program already existed which performed the same tasks as the
plaintiff's program in a different, manner foreclosed application of
the merger doctrine. 392 Although the court's holding seems logical
on its face, it is not quite accurate. Under merger, the question is
whether the means of expressing an idea are narrowly limited, not
whether there is at least one other way to express the idea.393 The
Broderbund court should have determined whether there were any
practical programming considerations limiting the choices availa-
ble to the defendant, rather than relying on its own observation
that there was another program accomplishing the same task in a
different way.394 By employing expert testimony during its succes-
sive filtering process, the integrated approach ensures that courts
will conduct the proper factual inquiry when applying copyright
doctrines in software infringement cases. Although courts are well-
versed in these doctrines, they are generally unfamiliar with the
process of writing computer programs. 395 The integrated approach
recognizes this shortcoming and employs expert testimony to
"flesh out" the factual situation for courts, enabling them to prop-
erly apply the appropriate legal doctrines to the case.
The court's opinion in Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback
Software International,396 discussed and criticized in Part IV
above, demonstrates yet another problem encountered by courts,
that of departing from well-settled legal doctrines. 97 The Lotus
court developed a three-part test that is basically in line with the
policies of copyright law.398 Each of the elements of the court's
test, however, deviates slightly from the law's standards, thereby
creating requirements that are potentially at odds with the Copy-
right Act and its judicial gloss. 399 By carefully adhering to well-
settled principles during successive filtering, the integrated ap-
392. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1132.
393. See supra text accompanying note 217.
394. Incidentally, the other program was "Stickybear Printer," a print-shop
program designed for children. Thus, an entirely different set of considerations
may have led to its different structure. See Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1132.
395. "The challenge to counsel to make comprehensible for the court the eso-
terica of bytes and modules is daunting." Q-Co, 608 F. Supp. at 610.
396. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
397. The Lotus opinion is discussed supra text accompanying notes 265-288.
398. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 60-62. For a discussion of this test and how it
echoes basic copyright policies, see supra text accompanying notes 283-288.
399. See supra text accompanying notes 183-188 for an explanation of this
problem.
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proach carefully tracks copyright law, eliminating the danger that
courts may set different standards for protection in software in-
fringement cases.
The integrated approach avoids the problem created by the
Johnson court's "iterative" test of limiting copyright protection for
non-literal program elements merely because those elements are
difficult to analyze.400 Similarly, the test avoids the approach taken
by the Whelan court of abandoning the bifurcated test and sacri-
ficing all of its advantages merely because that test is difficult to
apply.40 1 Instead, the integrated approach carefully preserves the
advantages of both the traditional bifurcated substantial similarity
test and the successive filtering approach and minimizes the
problems that arise when applying those tests to software infringe-
ment cases.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The computer industry nets billions of dollars every year on
new programs; it also loses approximately two billion dollars every
year on the illegal copying of such programs. In order to achieve
success in this vast consumer market, programmers must invest
substantial effort in designing the non-literal elements of new pro-
grams. Indeed, these non-literal elements are the most crucial in
determining the marketability of a new program. Copyright law
has emerged as the principal source of protection for computer
programs, but the extent of protection offered by copyright law to
the non-literal elements of programs is unclear. Because such non-
literal elements are expensive to develop and easy to copy, it is
essential to offer protection in order to encourage innovation in
this area. Without protection, the incentive to develop new user
interfaces and more efficient or creative screen displays will be re-
moved. Currently, there is uncertainty in the software industry
about the extent to which such program elements can be protected.
Courts addressing the protection of non-literal program ele-
ments fear that giving protection in instances where programming
choices are limited or dictated by functional or external considera-
tions will give monopolies that would inhibit competition. Tradi-
tional copyright law, however, has already developed a set of doc-
trines, such as merger and the idea/expression dichotomy, to
400. For a discussion of the approach taken by the Johnson court and its
reasons for doing so, see supra text accompanying notes 153-164.
401. See supra text accompanying note 181.
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prevent giving broad protection in such situations. Application of
the bifurcated substantial similarity test, integrating the successive
filtering approach, will allow courts, with proper expert assistance,
to apply these traditional copyright doctrines to computer pro-
grams without removing from the trier of fact the right to deter-
mine the ultimate question of infringement from the standpoint of
the ordinary observer. This approach should result in the protec-
tion of those non-literal elements of a program which are truly ex-
pressive, while denying protection of ideas or expressions that are
narrowly limited by efficiency or external considerations. The ap-
proach should lead to more principled decisionmaking and should
bring more certainty to the software industry.
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